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Abstract:  Governments and international organizations worry 
increasingly about systemic risk, under which the world’s financial system 
can collapse like a row of dominoes. There is widespread confusion, 
though, about the causes and even the definition of systemic risk, and 
uncertainty about how to control it. This article offers a conceptual 
framework for examining what risks are truly “systemic,” what causes 
those risks, and how, if at all, those risks should be regulated. Scholars 
historically have tended to think of systemic risk primarily in terms of 
financial institutions such as banks. However with the growth of 
disintermediation, in which companies can access capital market funding 
without going through banks or other intermediary-institutions, greater 
focus should be devoted to financial markets and the relationship between 
markets and institutions. This perspective reveals that systemic risk results 
from a type of tragedy of the commons in which market participants lack 
sufficient incentive, absent regulation, to limit risk taking in order to 
reduce the systemic danger to others. Law therefore has a role in reducing 
systemic risk.      
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Governments and international organizations are calling for increased regulation 
of systemic risk. In the United States, for example, Congress has been holding hearings 
on systemic risk in response to the recent subprime mortgage crisis and its impact on the 
mortgage-backed securities and commercial paper markets.
3 The U.S. Federal Reserve, 
the European Central Bank, and other monetary agencies worldwide have likewise 
expressed concern about this crisis and its potential systemic effects.
4 Governments are 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to Threats to the 
Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Committee on Financial Services, 110
th Cong. 
(Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ht1002072.shtml (hereinafter 
Systemic Risk Hearing). 
4 See, e.g., Lauren Young, Bernanke’s New Entourage, BUS. WK, Feb. 11, 2008, at 60 
(discussing the Federal Reserve’s concern over the subprime mortgage crisis and its 
potential systemic effect); Sumeet Desai & Gernot Heller, G-7 to Weigh Global Response 
to Credit Crisis, GUARDIAN UNLIM. (London), Feb. 8, 2008 (“Financial leaders from the 
world’s richest nations stood ready to discuss a global policy response to the [subprime 
mortgage] crisis, which has unleashed economic downdrafts and market turbulence that 
knows no borders.”); Martin Crutsinger, Housing Construction Keeps Falling, HOUS. 
CHRON. Dec. 19, 2007, at 3 (“[T]he European Central Bank[] move[d] to inject money 
into the European banking system to combat the global credit crunch triggered by the 
meltdown in subprime mortgages in the United States.”); Matthew Saltmarsh, Europe 
Fears U.S. Slump, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Dec. 5, 2007 at 12 (“In the strongest 
warning yet from a European Central Bank official that the 13-nation euro area is at risk 
from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, [Bank board member Christian Noyer] said 
optimism among consumers and executives was already deteriorating.”); Randal Smith, 
Carrick Mollenkamp, Joellen Perry, & Greg Ip, Loosening Up: How a Panicky Day Led 
the Fed to Act, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2007, at A1; Robert A. Eisenbeis et al., “An 
Analysis of Systemic Risks Posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an Evaluation of 
the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks” 13 (Apr. 2006) (Federal Reserve of 
Atlanta working paper 2006-2) (warning that the failure of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac 
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also increasingly concerned about the potential for systemic failure stemming from hedge 
fund collapses,
5 originally raised by the near collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management
6 and more recently prompted by the unregulated spread of hedge funds as a 
favored investment tool.
7 Financial leaders are also calling for increased focus on 
systemic risk that extends past the traditional, bank-oriented, approach.
8  
                                                                                                                                                 
could create credit restraints having negative real effects on liquidity and the issuance of 
mortgages). Concern about systemic risk also has arisen in the insurance industry. The 
fear is that the collapse of an insurer or reinsurer could cause a chain reaction of 
collapses, depriving business of the insurance needed to operate. Buddy, Could You Spare 
Us $15 Billion?, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 2008, at 38 (reporting that in the aftermath of 
the subprime mortgage crisis insurers are increasingly at risk for being downgraded by 
ratings agencies, and that “from a systemic point of view, when a monoline [insurer] is 
downgraded all of the paper it had insured must be downgraded too”). Cf. Chris Mundy, 
The Nature of Systemic Risk: Trying to Achieve a Definition, 12 BALANCE SHEET, No. 5, 
at 30 (2004) (discussing that post-911, the aviation insurance industry temporarily had to 
reduce insurance coverage below the level at which airlines could—according to their 
loan covenants and regulatory restrictions—continue to operate; and that governments 
had to intervene to provide coverage). 
5 A hedge fund is, essentially, a private and unregistered investment vehicle. Registration 
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg.  72,054, 72,055 
(Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 279). In today’s market environment, 
hedge funds commonly take investor “equity” money and also borrow money to make 
market bets, including leveraged bets (through derivatives) on market movements. From 
the standpoint of investors, the goal of hedge funds is to achieve high rates of return. 
From the standpoint of hedge fund managers, the goal is to earn substantial management 
fees. Hedge funds are estimated to have assets exceeding a trillion dollars. Troy A. 
Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, 
Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 981–82 (2006). 
6 See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
7 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, 
HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 31-
32 (April 1999) (hereinafter, “PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP”) (recommending measures 
to restrain excessive leverage of hedge funds); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
(GAO), LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO FOCUS GREATER 
ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 14-15 (Oct. 1998) (discussing the concern of regulators 
for the potential risks posed by hedge funds during period of declining credit standards); 
STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
IMPLICATION TO THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 89 (Sept. 2003) (recommending that the 
SEC amend Rule 203(b)(3)-1 to redefine “client” such that most hedge funds would 
require registration with the SEC); Anthony W. Ryan, Assistant Secretary for Financial 
Markets, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Remarks before the Managed Funds 
Association Conference (June 11, 2007) (transcript on file with author). See also Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Federal Reserve System, Remarks at the 
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There is, nonetheless, a great deal of confusion about what types of risk are truly 
“systemic”—the term meaning “[o]f or pertaining to a system”
9—and what types of 
systemic risk should be regulated. Alan Greenspan has summed up the confusion, 
observing that although “[i]t is generally agreed that systemic risk represents a propensity 
for some sort of financial system disruption[,] one observer might use the term ‘market 
failure’ to describe what another would deem to have been a market outcome that was 
natural and healthy, even if harsh.”
10 As a result, the “very definition [of systemic risk] is 
still somewhat unsettled.”
11  
                                                                                                                                                 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, 
Georgia (May 16, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/speeches/2006/200605162/default.htm) 
(offering thoughts on the systemic risk implications of the rapid growth of the hedge fund 
industry and on ways that policymakers might respond to those risks); Comments by 
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, The Diane Rehm Show, National 
Public Radio, May 9, 2007 (arguing that hedge funds should be regulated to avoid 
systemic risk). 
8 See John Gieve (Deputy Governor, Bank of England), Speech at the Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation Roundtable: Financial System Risks in the UK—Issues 
and Challenges (July 25, 2006) (observing the shift away from bank dominated finance); 
Andre Icard (Deputy Manager for the Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS]), Risk 
Measurement and Systemic Risk, Speech at the Fourth Joint Central Bank Research 
Conference on Risk Management and Systemic Risk (Nov. 8, 2005), available at 
www.bis.org/speeches/sp051108.htm (discussing the “evolution of systemic risk” to 
include interdependencies among banks, financial markets, and market infrastructure); 
Yutaka Yamaguchi, Triangular View of Systemic Risk and Central Bank Responsibility, 
Speech for the Third Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk (Bank for Int’l 
Settlements) (2002), available at http://www.bis.org/cgfs/conf/mar02h.pdf. (warning that 
in order to understand systemic risk, one must investigate the nexus among the banking 
system, financial markets, and the real economy). Cf. Gabriel Kolko, Weapons of Mass 
Financial Destruction, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Oct. 2006, at 1,2 (Eng.), 
available at http://mondediplo.com/2006/10/02finance (observing that the IMF is 
concerned that bank deregulation has allowed financial systems to become more 
vulnerable to systemic risk and to a growing number of financial crises). 
9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, general definition (2) (2d ed. 1989). 
10 George G. Kaufman, Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, THE CATO 
JOURNAL, Vol. 16 No. 1,  at 4 n. 5 (quoting Alan Greenspan, Remarks at a Conference on 
Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Washington, D.C. (1995)), available at 
http//:www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj16n1-2.html. 
11 Id. 
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Some commentators, for example, define systemic risk as “the probability that 
cumulative losses will occur from an event that ignites a series of successive losses along 
a chain of [financial] institutions or markets comprising . . . a system.”
12 Others, however, 
define it as “the potential for a modest economic shock to induce substantial volatility 
in asset prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and 
efficiency losses.”
13 Still others define it as “[t]he risk that a default by one market 
participant will have repercussions on other participants due to the interlocking nature of 
financial markets. For example, Customer A’s default in X market may affect 
Intermediary B’s ability to fulfill its obligations in Markets X, Y, and Z.”
14  
 
  These definitions are inconsistent in several ways. For example, the trigger event 
in the first is merely an “event,” in the second a “modest economic shock,” and in the 
third a “default by one market participant.” The consequences of the trigger event are 
also different, in the first definition being “a series of successive [and cumulative] losses 
along a chain of institutions or markets,” in the second being “substantial volatility in 
asset prices, significant reductions in corporate liquidity, potential bankruptcies and 
efficiency losses,” and in the third being merely “repercussions on other [market or 
                                                 
12 Id. at 4. Kaufman points out that this definition is consistent with that of other leaders 
in the banking and regulatory field. For example, the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) has defined systemic risk as the “risk that the failure of a participant to meet its 
contractual obligations may in turn cause other participants to default.” Id. The head of 
the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank has defined it as the “risk that one bank’s default 
may cause a chain reaction of . . . failures and even threaten the solvency of institutions.” 
Id.  
13 Paul Kupiec & David Nickerson, Assessing Systemic Risk Exposure from Banks and 
GSEs Under Alternative Approaches to Capital Regulation, 48 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & 
ECON. 123, 123 (2004) (observing further that a “key feature in the propagation of such 
a systemic shock is acute uncertainty regarding an institution’s ability to satisfy its 
immediate payment obligations and a simultaneous inability of counterparties to hedge 
such risk”). 
14 This is the definition favored by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/glossary/opaglossary_s.htm. Cf. Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic 
Risk and Hedge Funds, EFA Moscow Meeting Paper, at 1 (Feb. 22, 2005), available at 
http:/ssrn.com/abstact=671443 (defining systemic risk as “the possibility of a series of 
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interlocking market] participants.” There is not even agreement on whether systemic risk 
should be defined by reference to market losses or just market participant losses.
15 The 
only common factor in these definitions is that a trigger event causes a chain of bad 
economic consequences. 
 
If a problem cannot be defined, it cannot be solved—or, at least, it cannot be 
efficiently solved since confusion over the nature of the problem can obscure attempts to 
provide solutions. This article therefore proceeds, first, by trying to define systemic risk 
and by examining what it is about this risk that is most problematic. Building on that 
foundation, the article offers a conceptual framework for solving the problem of systemic 
risk, focusing on regulatory solutions. In that context, the article examines how risk 
itself—in particular, financial risk—should be regulated and then inquires how that 
regulatory framework should change by reason of the financial risk being systemic. 
Finally, the article focuses on systemic risk in an international context since, finance and 
markets being global, systemic collapse in one country can affect markets and institutions 
in other countries. To this end, the article examines the feasibility of international 
regulation, the extent to which regulatory solutions are universal or should be different 
for different countries, and the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom if regulation is 
done on only a national level.  
 
A threshold question is whether regulatory solutions are appropriate. This article 
argues they are because, like a tragedy of the commons,
16 no individual market 
                                                                                                                                                 
correlated defaults among financial institutions—typically banks—that occurs over a 
short period of time, often caused by a single major event”). 
15 The third definition focuses solely on repercussions to market participants. 
16 The classic example of a tragedy of the commons is an overgrazed pasture resulting 
from common ownership so that no individual owner has the right to exclude use by 
other owners. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 
(1968). The original concept of a tragedy of the commons can be traced back to Aristotle. 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Courier Dover, trans. by Benjamin Jowett) 57 (2000) (observing 
that “that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.  
Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest.”). 
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participant has sufficient incentive, absent regulation,
17 to limit its risk taking in order to 




  II. DEFINING SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
A common factor in the various definitions of systemic risk is that a trigger event, 
such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of bad economic 
consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect. These consequences could 
include (a chain of) financial institution and/or market failures. Less dramatically, these 
consequences might include (a chain of) significant losses to financial institutions or 
substantial financial-market price volatility. In either case, the consequences are to 
financial institutions, markets, or both.  
 
Financial Institutions: 
Banks and other financial institutions (collectively, “institutions”) are important 
sources of capital. Therefore their failure, especially in large numbers, can deprive 
society of capital and increase its cost. Increases in the cost of capital, or decreases in its 
availability, are the most serious direct consequences of a systemic failure.
19
 
                                                 
17 Tragedies of the commons sometimes can be addressed by regulators informally 
pressuring parties to work collectively. See Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, & Urs Fischbacher 
Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation, in THE DRAMA OF THE 
COMMONS 158 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002). This approach is discussed infra notes 
233-249 and accompanying text (discussing market discipline as an approach, and 
showing why it is insufficient). 
18 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.  
19 Statement by William J. McDonough, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of 
Representatives, Oct. 1, 1998 (stating that the most important direct consequence of 
systemic risk brought on by a failure of Long Term Capital Management would have 
been “increases in the cost of capital to American businesses”). See also E.P. DAVIS, 
DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 117 (1992) (describing the ultimately 
worst consequences of systemic risk as “disrupt[ing] the payments mechanism and the 
capacity of the financial system to allocate capital”). 
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The classic example of systemic risk in this context is a “bank run,” in which the 
inability of a bank to satisfy withdrawal-demands causes its failure, in turn causing other 
banks or their creditors to fail.
20 The original failure can occur when depositors panic, 
converging on the bank to quickly withdraw their monies. Because banks keep only a 
small fraction of their deposits on hand as cash reserves, a bank may have insufficient 
cash to pay all withdrawal-demands, causing it to default and ultimately fail.
21 The chain 
of subsequent failures can occur because banks are closely intertwined financially. They 
lend to and borrow from each other, hold deposit balances with each other, and make 
payments through the interbank clearing system (whereby banks with equity and deposit 
accounts exceeding their liabilities can offer these excess funds to other banks who wish 
to increase loans to their customers).
22 Because of this interconnectedness, one bank’s 
default on an obligation to another may adversely affect that other bank’s ability to meet 
its obligations to yet other banks, and “so on down the chain of banks and beyond.”
23   
 
This scenario is most graphically illustrated by the Great Depression.
24 In 
response to the stock market downturn of August 1929 and the crash of October 1929, 
depositors en masse attempted to convert their bank deposits into cash.
25 Many banks 
were unable to satisfy all of these demands, causing them to fail and contracting the 
money supply.
26 These failures, in turn, caused many otherwise solvent banks to 
                                                 
20 Mundy, supra note 4, at 29.  
21 R. W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 25, 145 (2005) 
(observing that a bank’s cash reserves are often less than 5% of its deposits). 
22 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 4. See also Juergen Eichberger & Martin Summer, Bank 
Capital, Liquidity and Systemic Risk, Working Paper series of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank (Working Paper 87), 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.oenb.at/de/img/wp87_1__tcm14-9846.pdf.  
23 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 4. See also Icard, supra note 8 (discussing how 
disturbances could arise and spread within the banking sector). 
24 Michael D. Bordo, Bruce Misrach, & Anna Schwartz, NBER Working Paper Series 
(No. 5371), Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons From 
History 3, 21 (1995). 
25 Id. at 21. To some extent this was in order to obtain funds to satisfy margin calls, and 
to some extent this was simply in panic. 
26 Id. 
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default,
27 and many companies, deprived of liquidity, were forced into bankruptcy.
28 
During the height of the Great Depression, from 1930 to 1933, there were approximately 
2000 bank failures yearly.
29
 
Although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of systemic risk, 
the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling companies to access the 
ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through banks or other 
financial intermediaries
30—is making these failures less critical than in the past.
31 
Companies today are able to obtain most of their financing through the capital markets 
without the use of intermediaries.
32 As a result, capital markets themselves are 
increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk.
33 Systemic disturbances can 
                                                 
27 Gary Richardson, Bank Distress During the Great Contraction, 1929 to 1933, New 
Data from the Archives of the Board of Governors 24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12590, 2006) (concluding that between 20% and 50% of bank 
failures were due to contagion/illiquidity chains). But cf. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph 
R. Mason, Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression 32–33 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7919, 2000) (arguing that most banks failed during 
the Great Depression for endogenous reasons and not because of financial intertwining). 
28 Bordo, Misrach, & Schwartz, supra note 24, at 21. 
29 FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 261 (7th ed. update 2006). 
30 Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in 
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2002). Capital markets are now the 
nation’s and the world’s most important sources of investment financing. See, e.g., 
McKinsey Global Institute, Mapping the Global Capital Markets Third Annual Report 
(Jan. 2007), reporting that as of the end of 2005, the value of total global financial assets, 
including equities, government and corporate debt securities, and bank deposits, was 
$140 trillion, available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/third_annual_report/index.asp. 
31 Cf. Bordo et al., supra note 24 (observing that “recent literature is less concerned than 
it was in earlier times with contagious banking panics as the key source of systemic 
risk”). 
32 WESLEY B. TRUITT, THE CORPORATION 107–09 (2006). Firms often use capital markets 
to turn illiquid assets into cash. For instance, through securitization, banks can turn long-
term mortgages into easily tradable securities. MEIR KOHN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
MARKETS 381 (2d ed. 2004). Firms can also borrow more cheaply through bonds and 
commercial paper than they can from banks. See Id. at 145. 
33 Yamaguchi, supra note 8. Yamaguchi, the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Japan, warns that financial markets now play a role as sources of systemic disturbances. 
Id. at 1. 
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erupt outside the international banking system and spread through capital-market 
linkages, rather than merely through banking relationships.
34   
 
Markets: 
Under modern finance theory, investors and other market participants can protect 
themselves from risk by diversifying their investments. To the extent risk is negatively 
correlated, or uncorrelated, with market risk, the randomly distributed risks of a 
diversified investment portfolio “would tend to cancel out, producing a riskless 
portfolio.”
35 To the extent systemic risk affects markets, however, it is positively 
correlated with the markets and cannot be diversified away.
36  
 
The near failure of Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) helps to illustrate 
the potential for this type of systemic risk. Although LTCM itself engaged in a 
diversified (and therefore inherently protective) hedging strategy, temporary market 
irrationality in bond pricing during August 1998, touched off by Russian government 
default on its bonds, caused LTCM to lose hundreds of millions of dollars and approach a 
default.
37 The Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System was concerned 
that LTCM’s default might shake confidence in worldwide financial markets: 
 
Had Long Term Capital been suddenly put into default, its [derivatives] 
counterparties would have immediately “closed out” their positions. If 
counterparties would have been able to close-out their positions at 
existing market prices, losses, if any, would have been minimal. 
However, if many firms had rushed to close-out hundreds of billions of 
dollars in transactions simultaneously, they would have been unable to 
liquidate collateral or establish offsetting positions at the previously-
                                                 
34 Icard, supra note 8, at 5. Bank deposits are merely a form of lending, from depositors 
to the bank. See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 116 S. Ct. 286, 290 (1996). 
35 Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 446 (6
th ed. 2003). 
36 Cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 446 (arguing that risk that is positively correlated with 
the market itself cannot be diversified away). Judge Posner implicitly assumes, of course, 
that the market risk at issue cannot be diversified away by investing in unlinked diverse 
markets. 
37 ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 86, 144–46, 164, 169–70 (2000). 
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Moreover, as a result of these market moves,  
 
there was a likelihood  that a number of credit and interest rate markets 
would . . . possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days 
and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of 
investor confidence, leading to a rush out of private credits, leading to 
further widening of credit spreads, leading to further liquidations of 
positions, and so on.
39
 
To avoid this scenario from playing out and raising the cost of capital,
40 the Federal 
Reserve proactively stepped in to broker a workout of LTCM’s debts.
41   
 
  There are overall similarities, however, between bank systemic risk and the kind 
of systemic risk represented by LTCM. In both, market shocks triggered institutional 
failures which in turn led, or could have led, to a chain of institutional and market 
failures. Both also were transmitted through linkages in a chain of relationships: in 
bank systemic risk, the linkages are interbank borrowings and the interbank clearing 
system for payments,
42 in LTCM the linkages arose from its derivatives-based hedging 
strategy with other institutions
43 which, in turn, had linkages with yet other institutions 
and markets. 
 
                                                 
38 Statement by McDonough, supra note 19 (describing ways that the problems of 
LTCM could have caused more widespread financial troubles). 
39 Id. 
40 See supra note 19 (the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
concluding that the most important consequence of systemic risk brought on by a 
failure of LTCM would have been increasing the cost of capital). 
41 Under the terms of this workout, existing lenders converted some of their debt to 90% 
of equity in LTCM and invested $3.65 billion of additional capital. LOWENSTEIN, supra 
note 37, at 209–10. 
42 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
43 A derivative is a contract under which the parties agree to exchange payments 
calculated by reference to the price of a commodity or financial instrument, a rate, index, 
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An Integrated Perspective: 
Institutional systemic risk and market systemic risk should therefore not be 
viewed each in isolation. Institutions and markets can be involved in both. Perhaps a 
better way to think about systemic risk is that its focus is sometimes critical financial 
intermediaries, like banks, that are pivotal to the funding of companies, and other times 
markets and/or institutions, such as hedge funds, that are either not financial 
intermediaries or at least not critical financial intermediaries.  
 
This integrated perspective is useful because a chain of failures of critical 
financial intermediaries, by definition, would significantly affect the availability and cost 
of capital. These failures, therefore, implicitly become a proxy for market 
consequences.
44 In contrast, a chain of failures of institutions that are not critical financial 
intermediaries could only significantly affect the availability or cost of capital when those 
failures are large enough to jeopardize the viability of capital markets. As 
disintermediation increases, therefore, systemic risk should increasingly be viewed by its 
impact on markets, not institutions per se. 
 
This perspective also reveals that the business or legal characterization of any 
given institution should be far less important, from the standpoint of systemic risk, than 
whether such institution is, in fact, a critical financial intermediary. Hedge funds, for 
example, are not critical financial intermediaries since they are not necessarily pivotal to 
the funding of companies. The likelihood that systemic risk would result from LTCM’s 
failure or from the failure of any other hedge fund therefore depends not on such entity’s 
characterization as a hedge fund per se but rather on the likelihood that its failure would 
                                                                                                                                                 
or some other economic measurement. See CHRISTIAN A. JOHNSON, OTC DERIVATIVES 
DOCUMENTATION 1 (2005). 
44 Cf. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 23 (observing that the “indirect 
impact” on markets of the failure of individual market participants is potentially “more 
serious” than such failure itself: “[v]olatility and sharp declines in asset prices [that] can 
heighten uncertainty about credit risk and disrupt the intermediation of credit,” which in 
turn “could cause a contraction of credit and liquidity, and ultimately[] heighten the risk 
of a contraction in real economic activity”). See also supra note 39 and accompanying 
text. 
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jeopardize the viability of capital markets.
45 Other than their lack of transparency—
making it difficult to publicly determine the size of hedge fund exposures—there is little 
inherently unique about hedge funds from the standpoint of systemic risk.
46 Equity 
investors in a failed hedge fund may lose their investments, but that should not 
necessarily raise concerns over systemic risk because those investors are necessarily 
wealthy and sophisticated
47 and, if they are prudent, the hedge-fund investment will be 
only part of a diversified investment portfolio.
48 Lenders to a failed hedge fund may not 
be repaid in full, but this is no different than a company defaulting on its debt, which is 
                                                 
45 Although the above paragraph focuses on systemic risk resulting from hedge-fund 
failure, hedge funds might indirectly contribute to bank systemic risk insofar as hedge-
fund lack of regulation enables them to make relatively risky investments, including risky 
loans. This may be forcing banks, in order to compete, to make loans without financial 
covenants. Interview with Douglas Rosefsky, Managing Director, Alvarez & Marsal 
(Durham, Mar. 21, 2007). This dilemma, however, does not arise out of the nature of 
hedge funds qua hedge funds but, rather, out of their unregulated nature, enabling them to 
make risky investments if they choose to do so. Moreover, it is questionable whether 
making loans without financial covenants (sometimes called “covenant-lite loans”) even 
constitutes “safe and sound” banking practice. Cf. Grover R. Castle, Term Lending—A 
Guide to Negotiating Term Loan Covenants and Other Financial Restrictions, J. COM. 
BANK LENDING 30-33 (Nov. 1980) (tables showing that most bank loans contain financial 
covenants); JOËL BESSIS, RISK MANAGEMENT IN BANKING 514 (2d ed. 2002) (“Covenants 
become essential whenever the credit standing of the borrower and/or the collateral do 
not provide adequate protection.”); Jyrki Niskanen & Mervi Niskanen, Covenants and 
Small Business Lending: The Finnish Case, 23 SMALL BUS. ECON. 137, 137 (2004) 
(observes that the norm in bank loan agreements in the U.S. is to include covenants). 
46 But cf. infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (explaining why hedge funds, as 
operated in today’s market environment, may pose greater risk potential than other types 
of business organizations).  
47 There is, however, dissent within the SEC over whether the “retailization” of hedge 
funds is increasingly exposing ordinary people to hedge-fund risk. Amie Filipchuk, 
Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2004: IX. Securities: C. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission's Registration Requirement for Hedge Fund Advisers 24 ANN. 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 189, 191, 194–95 (2005). 
48 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2004), exempts from the 
registration-statement and prospectus requirements of Section 5 of that Act “transactions 
by an issuer not involving any public offering.” This exemption has been interpreted to 
include a variety of different transactions where—taking into account the number of 
offerees, their relationship to each other and to the issuer, the number of units offered, 
and the manner of the offering—the SEC considers there is little benefit or no practical 
need for regulation. See L. LOSS & J. SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 395 (5th ed. 2004). 
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addressed as a regulatory matter through bankruptcy law. Derivatives counterparties to a 
failed hedge fund may not be paid if the derivatives settle in their favor; but this is no 
different than a company defaulting on its obligations to derivatives counterparties, which 
again is addressed as a regulatory matter through bankruptcy law. In LTCM, the potential 
for systemic risk existed not by reason of its intrinsic status as a hedge fund but by the 




Nevertheless, hedge funds, as operated in today’s market environment, have 
greater systemic-risk potential than many other types of business organizations. Their 
managers aggressively seek above-market profits and quick returns
51 and employ 
investing strategies that may converge.
52 But these characteristics are not intrinsic to the 
nature of a hedge fund as a private and unregistered investment vehicle,
53 and indeed 
other types of business organizations, including private-equity firms and even ordinary 
                                                 
49 See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing LTCM’s billions of dollars 
of exposure). See also PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 2 (comparing 
hedge funds to “other large highly leveraged financial institutions” in terms of their 
“potential to disrupt the functioning of financial markets”); Roger Ferguson & David 
Laster, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, FIN. STABILITY REV., issue no. 10 (Apr. 2007), at 
45, 51 (arguing that the failure of Amaranth, unlike the case of LTCM, “posed little 
systemic risk because [the losses] occurred in a relatively small and isolated market”).  
50 This “size matters” observation would apply not only to a single large hedge fund but 
also to multiple hedge funds adopting a similar investment strategy (“convergence”) that, 
collectively, are large. Cf. Anthony Murphy, Managing Director, Citi Markets and 
Banking, Remarks at the International Insolvency Institute seventh annual conference’s 
panel, “Understanding Derivatives: Dissecting Complex Financial Instruments,” June 12, 
2007 (on file with author). 
51 Sometimes, also, poor management controls can make hedge funds more “fragile” than 
other institutions. Cf. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 5 (observing that 
hedge funds sometimes take on “structured or illiquid positions whose full value cannot 
be realized in a quick sale,” potentially making them “somewhat fragile institutions” 
compared to other trading institutions because they are more vulnerable to “liquidity 
shocks”). Even though banks and securities firms sometimes take similar illiquid 
positions, “those organizations and their parent firms often have both liquidity sources 
and independent streams of income from other activities that can offset the riskiness of 
their positions.” Id. 
52 See supra note 50. 
53 See supra note 5. 
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operating companies, can and sometimes do engage in aggressive or converging 
investment strategies similar to those used by hedge funds.
54     
 
Synthesizing these factors, we can reach a working definition of systemic risk: the 
risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a 
panic or otherwise) either (x) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (y) a 
chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of 
capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market 
price volatility.
55 As clarified below, this definition of systemic risk will underlie the 
analysis in the remainder of this article, including the example used in Parts III.B and 
III.C to help identify and assess regulatory approaches.
56
 
This definition must be clarified in two ways. First, systemic risk should be 
distinguished from downturns that are caused by normal market swings. Although these 
downturns are sometimes conflated with systemic risk, they are more appropriately 
labeled systematic risk, meaning simply risk that cannot be diversified away and 
therefore affects most if not all market participants.
57 As regulators call for management 
of systemic risk, it is important not to constrain market freedom in ways that deter 
systematic risk, which facilitates market equilibrium and curbs excessive interest rates or 
periods of inflation.
58 Second, systemic risk is an economic, not a political, definition. It 
should not be used uncritically as an ex post political label for any large financial failure 
or downturn.   
                                                 
54 [cite] 
55 Cf. note 19 and accompanying text. 
56 See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text. 
57 Campbell R. Harvey’s Hypertextual Finance Glossary, at 
http://www.duke.edu/%7Echarvey/Classes/wpg/bfgloss.htm#systematic_risk. See also 
Bordo et al., supra note 24, at
 8 (referring to this as the “financial fragility” approach). In 
an expanding market, for example, optimism accelerates as investors reach a state of 
over-indebtedness, followed by insufficient cash flows to service liabilities. Distressed 
selling may then occur. These inevitable market fluctuations appear to be systematic, not 
systemic, although they sometimes might trigger systemic problems. Id at 10.  
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III. REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK 
 
A. The Appropriateness of Regulation 
 
Whether systemic risk should be regulated can be viewed as a subset of the 
question of whether it is appropriate to regulate financial risk. This article attempts to 
answer that general question and then examines how the answer should change by reason 
of the financial risk being systemic.  
 
Regulating Financial Risk: 
Scholars argue that the primary if not sole justification for regulating financial 
risk
59 is maximizing economic efficiency.
60 Efficiency is thus the central goal of the U.S. 
securities laws,
61 and it likewise appears to be the central goal of securities laws 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 [cite] But cf. Bordo et al., supra note 24, at 9 (discussing how normal market 
expansions and contractions can turn into market crises in situations of “speculative 
mania”).  
59 Although scholars also view regulation through public choice theory, that is not a 
normative goal but, rather, merely a descriptive explanation of what actually occurs. 
Public choice theory views regulation as the outcome of the efforts of interest groups, 
politicians, and bureaucrats to use the political process for their own personal benefit, 
generating regulations in the absence of market failures. RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT 
E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 82 (1995). 
60 W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON, & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 9 (3d ed.  2000) (arguing that, where health and safety are 
not at issue, the rationale for regulatory policy is “foster[ing] improvements judged in 
efficiency terms”); Gillian Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from the 
Middle and the Digital Ages 58 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/000329600.pdf?abstractid=220252) (arguing 
that the “public value at stake in relationships between commercial entities . . . is 
economic efficiency”). 
61 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 9 (3d ed. 1996). See also 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751-52 (1984) (arguing that the strongest arguments for the 
mandatory disclosure system under securities law are based on efficiency); GEORGE J. 
STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 88 (1975) (arguing that economic efficiency 
should be the central goal of the U.S. securities laws because “efficient capital markets 
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worldwide.
62 It includes maintaining competition, protecting investors against fraud and 
other similar abuses, preventing externalities (or requiring those causing externalities to 
internalize their costs), and correcting other market failures.
63
 
Because systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a central 
goal in its regulation. Without regulation, the externalities caused by systemic risk would 
not be prevented or internalized because the motivation of market participants “is to 
protect themselves but not the system as a whole. . . . No firm . . . has an incentive to 
limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of contagion for other firms.”
64 This 
observation holds true even for banks, which (absent regulation) will protect themselves 
but not the stability of the banking system.
65 Moreover, even if market participants were 
able to collectively act to prevent systemic risk, they might not choose to do so. This is 
because the externalities of systemic failure include social costs that can extend far 
                                                                                                                                                 
are the major protection of investors”) (emphasis in original). Although some have 
suggested that fairness is also an important goal of securities regulation, fairness might 
only be relevant in this context as a means of achieving efficiency. See, e.g., The Bond 
Price Competition Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Finance 
and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106
th Cong. 9 (1999) 
(statement of Hon. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) 
(testifying that “[i]nformed investors, armed with accurate information, ensure that 
market prices represent fair values. And fair market prices, in turn, ensure that the 
markets perform their economic function of efficiently allocating capital resources”). 
62 HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 46 (7
th ed. 2000) 
(arguing that the goal of securities law is to “develop a global regulatory framework that 
preserves the efficiencies associated with international capital mobility”). 
63 HENDRIK S. HOUTHAKKER & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 285 (1996). See also DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS IN THE 1990S 21 (1990); HERRING & LITAN, supra note 59, at 79. Regulating 
markets to correct market failure is sometimes referred to as the “public interest theory.” 
GOWLAND, supra at 21. 
64 See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 31.  
65 See Rodrigo Cifuentes, Gianluigi Ferrucci, & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity Risk and 
Contagion 17-18 (working paper, Jan. 19, 2004, on file with author) (observing that 
“when choosing their portfolio allocation banks do not internalise the positive 
externalities that holding more liquidity has on the stability of the system. Therefore, the 
privately determined liquidity will be sub-optimal.”). 
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beyond market participants.
66 Market participants thus will not want to internalize those 
costs and will take an insufficient amount of care in preventing them.  
  
As a result, there is a type of tragedy of the commons, in which the benefits of 
exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market participants, each of whom 
is motivated to maximize use of the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation, which 
affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of persons.
67 
Furthermore, behavioral psychology predicts that individual market participants—by 
discounting the impact of systemic risk since it is so rare relative to other market risks, 
thereby increasing the apparent net positive expected value of acting selfishly
68—may 
perceive an even greater mismatch between benefits and costs.
69 To minimize the 
externalities caused by this tragedy of the commons (and thereby maximize efficiency), 
regulation of systemic risk appears not only appropriate but necessary.
70  
 
Beyond Economic Efficiency: 
                                                 
66 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (discussing the social impact of a 
systemic collapse of the financial system). 
67 Hardin, supra note 16. 
68 See infra note 246 and accompanying text.  
69 In other words, individual market participants may choose to act selfishly because their 
returns are assured whereas a systemic collapse is not necessarily inevitable. LTCM, for 
instance, knew there was a risk of failure if the markets became irrational but chose to 
trust models that made them money. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 71–75, 173. Ignoring 
a possible greater risk for the sake of personal gain is not unique to the world of finance. 
Before the Challenger disaster, engineers knew of the risk that the rubber O-rings might 
fail at cold temperature and argued that the launch should be delayed until warmer 
weather. Engineers also identified the potential for wing damage before the Columbia 
disaster. In both cases, however, NASA administrators appeared to have been less 
concerned about the possible safety risks than about the impact on their personal 
reputations of canceling flights. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: 
MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 159–61 (2007).  
70 Cf. Cifuentes et al., supra note 65, at 18 (observing that because banks do not 
internalize externalities regarding financial-system stability, liquidity and capital 
requirements “need to be externally imposed”). The need for regulation must be 
balanced, of course, by its cost. The extent to which the benefits of systemic-risk 
regulation exceed its costs, and the extent to which such regulation is more cost effective 
when implemented on an ex ante preventative or ex post reactive basis, is discussed infra 
Parts III.C and III.D. 
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Efficiency, however, should not be the only goal of regulating systemic risk. Even 
though systemic risk is a form of financial risk, it stands apart and should be 
differentiated from traditional financial risk. Traditional financial risk focuses on risks 
within the financial system, and then efficiency should plainly be the central goal. 
Conversely, systemic risk focuses on risks to the financial system.
71  
 
This distinction reveals that systemic risk transcends economic efficiency per se. 
Failure of the financial system can generate social costs in the form of widespread 
poverty and unemployment, which in turn can destroy lives and foster crime.
72 Although 
efficiency in a broad sense includes health and safety, these are sometimes viewed from a 
regulatory standpoint as going beyond efficiency.
73 Protecting health and safety therefore 
should be additional goals of regulating systemic risk.  
 
These additional goals can be reduced, however, to the single goal of preserving 
stability of the financial system, since preserving stability would prevent the breakdown 
that could lead to health and safety concerns. This approach finds a measure of indirect 
empirical support in the report recently issued by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) in connection with an anticipated bird-flu pandemic.
74 DHS has prepared a list of 
seventeen industry sectors, including banking and finance, that might be affected by a 
pandemic and whose breakdown could have a debilitating impact on national economic 
                                                 
71 I thank my colleague, Ralf Michaels, for this insight into differentiating risks within, 
and to, the financial system. 
72 The widespread poverty and unemployment caused by the Great Depression, for 
example, apparently fostered a significant increase in crime. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, 
Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United 
States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 11 (Winter 2002) (discussing an explosion of executions 
as probably resulting from increased crime due to the Great Depression). Cf. Erin Ryan, 
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 636-37 (2007) (“pragmatism . . . 
seems well-suited to the circumstances of the time: massive unemployment, farmer 
uprisings and hunger marches, public rioting, and widespread fear of revolt.”). 
73 VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 60, at 9. 
74 See Department of Homeland Security, Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, 
and Recovery, Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, available at 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/pdf/CIKRpandemicInfluenzeGuide.pdf. 
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security, public health, and safety.
75 In each case, DHS’s primary goal is to preserve the 
stability of these industry sectors in the face of a pandemic.
76  
 
For analysis purposes, the remainder of this article will assume that preservation 
of the financial system is socially desirable
77 and thus stability should be an important 
regulatory goal.
78 The goals of regulating systemic risk thus should include both 
efficiency and stability.
79  
                                                 
75 Critical industry sectors are broken down into critical infrastructure and key resources. 
Critical infrastructure is defined as systems and assets so vital to the U.S. that their 
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic 
security, national public health, safety, or any combination of those. Id. at 20. Critical 
infrastructure is identified as banking and finance, food and agriculture, national 
monuments and icons, chemical and hazardous materials, defense industrial base, water, 
public health and healthcare, energy, emergency services, information technology, 
telecommunications, postal and shipping, and transportation. Id. at 7. Key resources are 
identified as commercial facilities, government facilities, dams, and nuclear power plants. 
Id. 
76 Id. at 20. DHS is concerned that a pandemic, by disturbing these industry sectors, 
might cause “economic disruption” and “social disturbance.” Id. at 32.  
77 This is not to say that preserving the financial system will always be socially optimal. 
An iconoclast might contend that collapse of the financial system could, in the long run, 
sometimes be beneficial for society, such as by redistributing wealth (although there is no 
assurance how wealth would be redistributed, and it is likely that overall wealth would be 
much diminished). Even the Great Depression arguably resulted in some desirable 
changes, such as social security, that might not otherwise have been politically feasible. 
But cf. Milton Friedman, Social Security Chimeras, N.Y. TIMES,  Jan. 11, 1999 at A17 
(finding it “hard to justify requiring 100 percent of the people to adopt a government-
prescribed [social security] straitjacket”).
78 Another way to view stability as a goal of systemic-risk regulation derives from the 
recognition that, in matters of health and safety, increasing social well-being and not 
economic efficiency alone is generally understood to be the goal of regulation. Because it 
is difficult to identify non-efficiency goals for traditional financial regulation (cf. Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 331-32 (2002)), it might seem 
that any ultimate inquiry into consequences would require empirical testing and, to some 
extent, may be more of a political than a legal determination. In the case of systemic risk, 
however, the answer may be more straightforward: the non-efficiency goals should be 
those needed to prevent systemic risk’s devastating consequences to health and safety. It 
is these consequences, not the inherent nature of systemic risk per se, that makes the 
question of regulating systemic risk most important. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (arguing for pragmatism by paying attention to 
consequences, and contending this is more important than legal formalism or seeking 
high principles); Yamaguchi, supra note 8 (also considering consequences). These 
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Regulatory Costs and “Efficiency”: 
These goals can help to identify potential approaches to regulating systemic risk. 
Any regulatory regime incorporating these goals should be carefully crafted, however, 
because regulation is not costless.
80 Indeed, its costs—which are both direct and 
indirect—can be high.
81 The former include the cost of hiring government (or 
government-delegated) employees to enforce the regulation as well as associated 
monitoring and compliance costs.
82 The latter include unintended consequences of 
                                                                                                                                                 
consequences can be prevented, however, by preventing the collapse of the financial 
system. 
79 Although I recognize that efficiency, in a broad sense, includes not only health and 
safety (see supra note 73 and accompanying text) but also stability, it will be analytically 
useful to view stability as separate from efficiency per se.  
80 See, e.g., JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK 19 (2000): 
“[R]egulation can be expensive and oppressive or even downright wrongheaded. Overly 
fastidious regulation may result in risks being overpriced, and hence will stifle enterprise. 
. . . A balance needs to be struck . . . .” See also EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, 
A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 309-10 (1978) (warning that “the history of 
[government] interventions to deal with market failure is a history of disappointments 
[and hence one] should recognize that market failure does not mandate government 
intervention; it just suggests the possibility that such intervention might prove 
beneficial”). Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L. J. 425, 476 n. 225 (1997) (discussing the ability of market 
participants, in this case lenders, to find alternative markets; in the case of systemic risk, 
however, shifting investments to foreign markets (capital flight) would harm the domestic 
economy). Regulation also can be misguided or counterproductive, sometimes even 
conflating cause and effect. Cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 456 (observing that securities 
market regulation is “founded on the premise that without such regulation [such markets] 
would not function satisfactorily,” but then arguing, id. at 457, that this premise “is 
rooted in part in a misconception about the great depression of the 1930s”—the 
misconception being the natural tendency to think of the 1929 stock market crash as 
resulting from abuses and, in turn, being a cause of the depression, whereas a precipitous 
decline in stock prices is more likely to result from the expectation of a decline in 
economic activity). 
81 Even where there is market failure, “government intervention may not [always] yield a 
superior outcome.” VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 60, at 10. See also id. at 13 (observing that 
“‘government failure’ may be of the same order of importance as market failure”).  
82 See, e.g., D. T. Llewwllyn, Competition and the Regulatory Mix, NAT’L WESTMINSTER 
BANK Q. REV., Aug. 1987, at 4-5. See also EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 19 
(observing that overly fastidious regulation may result in risks being overpriced).  
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regulation, such as moral hazard,
83 loss of economic welfare caused by firms performing 
fewer transactions, and the dynamic costs of regulations acting as a barrier to 
innovation.
84 For example, government intervention (or bailout loans) to prop up a failing 
company can foster moral hazard by making companies take more risks and investors act 
less diligently or cautiously.




                                                 
83 The term “moral hazard” has various related meanings. In the insurance context, in 
which the term arose, it means “the deliberate efforts by the insured to bring about the 
insured event, as when the owner of life insurance commits suicide.” Richard A. Epstein, 
Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 653 (1985).  See 
generally Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979) 
(providing an economic analysis of the standard of care for the insured in the moral 
hazard context).  In a more general economic context, however, the term simply refers to 
the greater tendency of people who are protected from the consequences of risky 
behavior to engage in such behavior.  See Charles G. Hallinan, The “Fresh Start” Policy 
in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 49, 84 (1986) (relying on the economic definition of moral hazard: debtors and 
creditors that are protected from the consequences of default “could be expected to 
increase both excessive borrowing and excessive resort to bankruptcy”). 
84 GOWLAND, supra note 63, at 21. 
85 In a non-financial context, an example would be government aid (somewhat analogous 
to bailout loans) to flood-plain homeowners that encourages those homeowners to re-
build in the flood plain. Robert McLeman & Barry Smit, Vulnerability to Climate Change 
Hazards and Risks: Crop and Flood Insurance, 50 CAN. GEOGRAPHER 217 passim 
(2006). 
86 For example, regulation that is a knee-jerk political reaction to market failure may be 
unnecessary and, to the extent the market naturally adjusts to information that caused its 
failure, counterproductive. According to the late Milton Friedman, the government’s 
policy of contracting the capital supply in the banking market exacerbated the severity of 
the Great Depression. He asserted that the capital contraction was born of economic 
regulators’ tendency to react to crises unadvisedly. Milton Friedman, Have Monetary 
Policies Failed?, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 11, 12 (May 1972) (“There was no need for 
monetary authorities to permit a decline of one-third in the quantity of money. They 
could have prevented a decline and produced an increase. If they had, I do not believe the 
great depression would have occurred. In that sense, monetary policy failed.”). See also 
Francis A. Bottini, An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and 
Proposals for Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 610-11 
(1993) (observing that “[t]oo much regulation inhibits economic growth by increasing 
costs and making capital harder to raise”). 
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In identifying regulatory approaches, the discussion below therefore takes into 
account not only the goals of stability and efficiency but also the costs of regulation 
based on these goals. Although the concept of efficiency should technically embody 
costs, there are two notions of efficiency at issue here. The first notion concerns 
efficiency in the context of systemic risk, which means preventing or internalizing 
externalities and correcting market failures.
87 Because systemic risk can cause market 
failures and associated externalities,
88 any regulatory approach that reduces systemic 
risk—and thus presumably any of the regulatory approaches identified below—will be 
efficient under that first notion. The discussion below therefore need not focus on this 
first notion of efficiency. The second notion of efficiency concerns the costs of 
regulation. Because regulation can be costly, efficiency also demands that the costs of 
regulation do not exceed its benefits.
89 This second notion of efficiency thus becomes 
more transparent by separately recognizing those costs.
90     
 
B. Identifying Regulatory Approaches 
 




                                                 
87 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
88 Whether efficiency should also be judged by whether the financial system being 
stabilized is itself efficient is beyond the scope of this article, which assumes for analysis 
purposes that the existing financial system is efficient and thus preserving it is a public 
good. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (discussing whether collapse of the 
financial system sometimes could, in the long run, be beneficial for society). 
89 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 13-14 (4th ed. 1992) 
(discussing this “Kaldor-Hicks” standard as the operating standard of efficiency). Accord, 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1015 
(2001). 
90 See infra notes 263-266 and accompanying text (computing the cost-benefit efficiency 
of regulating systemic risk by separately recognizing R, the cost of regulation). 
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Historically, regulation of systemic risk has focused largely on preventing bank 
failure.
91 For example, federal insurance of bank deposits through the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) is intended to prevent bank runs by alleviating fear that 
banks will default on deposit accounts.
92 Also, capital adequacy requires banks to hold 
minimum levels of capital, a requirement intended to limit excessive risk taking and 
buffer against financial crisis.
93 Recently, the Basel II Capital Accord (“Basel II”) 
articulated a system of capital holding requirements based on banks’ risk exposures as the 
first of three regulatory “pillars.”
94 Basel II outlines credit risk, operational risk, and 
market risk as the three issues that should influence capital holding requirements.
95 The 
benefits of Basel II are said to include greater transparency and a “state of the art” 
approach to risk management that “make banking safer and more profitable.”
96
 
Even in their limited contexts, these approaches are imperfect. Some economists 
argue, for example, that rules preventing bank failure can cause moral hazard. Banks may 
increase risk exposures and reduce their capital ratios, knowing that the safety net will 
protect against sudden runs.
97 And the creation of the FDIC safety net of deposit 
insurance removed “a major automatic mechanism by which troubled banks were 
previously closed and resolved” when depositors withdrew funds from insolvent banks.
98 
Deposit insurance also can permit insolvent banks to remain in operation and continue to 
                                                 
91 Yamaguchi, supra note 8, at 2. 
92 Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal, 62 MD. L. REV. 
515, 543-44 (2003). 
93 EICHBERGER & SUMMER, supra note 22, at 1; DAVIS, supra note 19, at 124-26. 
94 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 26-217 
(June 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
95 Id. 
96 MARC B. LAMBRECHT, THE BASEL II RATING: ENSURING ACCESS TO FINANCE YOUR 
BUSINESS 9 (2005). See also Jaime Caruana in C.E.V. BORIO, MARKET DISCIPLINE 
ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 25 (2004). 
97 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 5. See also id. at 18 (quoting Anna Schwartz). Cf. POSNER, 
supra note 35, at 461 (arguing that the widespread bank failures during the 1930s were 
“thought, perhaps erroneously, to have been an important cause of the severity of the 
business contraction,” resulting in excessive banking regulation). 
98 Kaufman, supra note 10, at 6. 
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generate losses,
99 such as the $150 billion of losses generated by the ongoing operation of 
insolvent savings and loan associations.
100
 
Capital requirements are similarly imperfect. Constraining lending activities of 
banks can redirect funds to lenders whose constraints are not binding.
101 Capital 
requirements also are said to undercut the ability of banks to build equity value.
102 These 




After the near-failure of LTCM, an attempt also has been made to study how to 
mitigate systemic risk arising from hedge-fund failure. However the main government 
report, spearheaded by the Federal Reserve Board, provided only general 
recommendations such as increased public disclosure of hedge fund activity, increased 
disclosure by public companies of exposures to highly-leveraged hedge funds, enhanced 
private sector risk-management practices, expanded risk-assessment authority for 
regulators over unregulated broker dealers and futures commission merchants, and 
                                                 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See Jane D’Arista, Financial Regulation in a Liberalized Global Environment, in 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION 75, 76 (John Eatwell & 
Lance Taylor eds., 2002) (discussing reciprocal flight of American and British banking 
activity to avoid domestic regulation). 
102 EICHBERGER & SUMMER, supra note 22, at 22 (arguing that “[b]anks which face a 
binding capital adequacy constraint and whose firms are successful will end up with 
positive, but lower equity value than in a situation without regulation. Thus, in the 
following period, they are likely to be constrained again. Hence, capital adequacy 
constraints affect[] also the capacity of banks to build up equity value.”). 
103 Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT L. 
REV. 741, 781-82 (Spring 2000) (arguing that bank capital adequacy requirements are 
“seriously flawed” because their heavy reliance on credit ratings leads to inaccuracies, 
banks are able to use derivatives to add risk in ways that these requirements do not take 
into account, and such requirements also “rely on short-term measures of [earnings] 
volatility that do not capture the risks of bank failure”). 
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increased off-shore hedge fund compliance with international standards.
104 Even the 
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board acknowledges the ongoing challenge.
105  
 
Finally, although certain governmental bodies such as the U.S. General 
Accounting Office and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have 
recommended specific oversight practices and reporting requirements for hedge funds,
106 
these practices and requirements do not focus on systemic risk per se. The SEC, for 
example, is concerned about secret agreements that give some, but not all, hedge-fund 
investors privileged information about holdings or special redemption terms and about 
the tendency of some hedge fund managers to overvalue fund assets to maximize 
performance-based management fees or to hide losses.
107 These problems are real,
108 but 
their significance pales in comparison to the problem of systemic risk.
109 Furthermore, 
the SEC appears to lack the jurisdiction to attack even these peripheral problems: 
 
                                                 
104 See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7, at 29-43. 
105 Bernanke, supra note 7, at 2-4 (observing that although, “provisional[ly],” the 
recommendations of the PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP “apparently have been effective” 
in that hedge-fund failures have not, “for the most part,” resulted in losses to creditors 
and counterparties and there is a “general perception among market participants . . . that 
hedge funds are less highly leveraged” (though noting the possibility of non-transparent 
leverage), “some concerns about counterparty risk management remain and may have 
become even more pronounced given the increasing complexity of financial products” 
and the fact that “hedge funds have greatly expanded their activities and strategies”). 
Subsequent to Bernanke’s report, a consensus has arisen—contrary to the “general 
perception” Bernanke refers to above—that hedge funds are now much more highly 
leveraged than ever. See, e.g., Randall Smith & Susan Pulliam, Outer Limits: As Funds 
Leverage Up, Fears of Reckoning Rise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2007, at A1. 
106 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7. 
107 Mara der Hovanesian, The SEC Isn’t Finished with Hedge Funds, BUS. WK. 34 (July 
17, 2006). 
108 For additional non-systemic problems that might be the province of SEC regulation, 
see Paredes, supra note 5, at 6-7.  
109 See, e.g., Chan et al., supra note 14; Timothy F. Geithner, Hedge Funds and Their 
Implications for the Financial System, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Nov. 17, 
2004); PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7; Toward Greater Financial 
Stability: A Private Sector Perspective, Counterparty Risk Management Group II 
(2005) (all of these articles, from the economic and financial literature, recognizing 
systemic risk as the central issue of hedge fund failure). 
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[M]anaging systemic risk is a decision for the [U.S.] Treasury Department 
or the Federal Reserve, not the SEC. The SEC’s charge is not to remedy 
concerns rooted in excessive leverage or complex derivatives transactions 
or otherwise to manage risk in financial markets. The fact that the SEC 
might worry about systemic risk does not give it jurisdiction over the 
matter . . . .
110  
 
The primary lesson of these historical approaches is that attempts to regulate 
systemic risk can be imperfect and messy. Other lessons are quite secondary because the 
historical focus has been on bank systemic risk whereas modern models of systemic risk 
should be additionally focused on non-bank and market failures. To appreciate the 
difference, consider the recent subprime mortgage crisis. The Federal Reserve attempted 
to reduce the likelihood that this crisis might affect other financial markets by cutting the 
discount rate, which is the interest rate the Federal Reserve charges a bank to borrow 
funds when a bank is temporarily short of funds.
111 The European Central Bank and other 
central banks similarly cut the interest rate they charge to borrowing banks.
112 These 
steps, however, directly impacted banks, not financial markets.
113 Furthermore, changes 
in monetary policy, such as cutting interest rates, may not work quickly enough—or may 
even be too weak—to quell panics, falling prices, and systemic collapse.
114 The models 
advanced in this article are intended to deter these failures by augmenting, not replacing, 
                                                 
110 Paredes, supra note 5, at 21. Accord, Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 
2006). 
111 See Greg Ip, Robin Sidel & Randall Smith, Stronger Steps: Fed Offers Banks Loans to 
Ease Credit Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18-19, 2007, Weekend Ed., at A1; 
http://www.duke.edu/%7Echarvey/Classes/wpg/bfglosd.htm (visited Aug. 20, 2007). 
112 Smith, Mollenkamp, Perry, & Ip, supra note 4, at A8. 
113 Ip, Sidel, & Smith, supra note 111, at A8 (observing that “the [Fed’s] discount 
window’s reach in the current crisis is limited by the fact that only banks can use it, and 
they aren’t the ones facing the greatest strains”). 
114 See infra note 120 (observing that because financial markets are tightly coupled, 
spiraling events may well occur rapidly, within days). Cf. Seth Carpenter & Selva 
Demiralp, The Liquidity Effect in the Federal Funds Market: Evidence from Daily Open 
Market Operations, 38 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 901, 918-919 (2006) (concluding 
that although a change in monetary policy can begin to affect the cost of capital within a 
day, its full effects can take much longer); Serena Ng, Greg Ip, & Shefali Anand, Fed 
Fails So Far In Bid to Reassure Anxious Investors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2007, at A1. 
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traditional monetary policy. The article therefore next considers potential future 
regulatory approaches to complement monetary policy.
115
 
Potential Future Approaches: 
To identify regulatory approaches, it is useful to think not only conceptually but 
also in concrete terms. For the latter purpose, it might be helpful to consider the 
following generic example, which is consonant with the working definition of systemic 
risk suggested here
116 and consistent with supposition by the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long Term Capital 
Management
117 as well as testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Banking and Financial Services
118 of what a systemic market meltdown 
could look like. A large hedge fund or private-equity company defaults. Its many 
contractual counterparties rush to try to close out or otherwise protect their positions on 
hundreds of billions of dollars in transactions. As a result, collateral is liquidated and 
assets are sold in “fire-sales,” causing prices to drop sharply.
119 The price-drops in turn 
exacerbate the rush to close out positions, which in turn causes prices to drop further. 
The price-drops become so severe that one or more capital markets stop functioning, at 
least temporarily. Investors lose confidence and begin withdrawing their money from 
the remaining capital markets, weakening those markets and—due to a perception, if 
not reality, of heightened default risk—leading to a significant widening of credit 
spreads and a resulting higher cost of capital. In a vicious cycle, the increased cost of 
                                                 
115 For an in-depth analysis of the subprime mortgage crisis, its impact on financial 
markets, and its application to the principles discussed in this article, see Steven L. 
Schwarcz, “Systemic Risk in Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage 
Meltdown” (forthcoming). 
116 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. 
117 Cf. supra note 44 and references therein. 
118 Cf. supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
119 See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 19, at 127-28 (describing how markets are depressed 
when failing institutions are forced by creditors to liquidate their assets in distress sales). 
See also infra note 125 and accompanying text (discussing how forced sales of assets to 
meet margin calls can depress asset prices, creating a downward pricing spiral); Cifuentes 
et al., supra note 65, at 5-6 (noting the “recent theoretical findings on banking and 
financial crises that has emphasised the limited capacity of the financial markets to 
absorb sales of assets”). 
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capital triggers defaults, and also causes further liquidations of positions (to generate 
cash) and thus further price-drops.
120  
 
Based on the normative rationales for regulating systemic risk, the lessons of 
historical regulation, and the foregoing example, this article next examines a range of 
potential regulatory approaches. Certain of these approaches are ex ante preventative, or 
prophylactic, to reduce the risk of systemic collapse; others are ex post reactive to 
mitigate the spread and consequences of systemic collapse.      
 
Averting Panics.  The ideal regulatory approach aims to eliminate the risk of 
systemic collapse, ab initio. Theoretically this goal could be achieved by preventing 
financial panics, since they are often the triggers that commence a chain of failures. 
Economists sometimes refer to this approach as the “monetarist” approach, identifying 
systemic risk with banking panics that produce monetary contraction.
121 This approach 
appears to be a key feature of existing bank regulation, which endeavors to prevent bank 
runs through governmental deposit insurance.
122 Panics can trigger market failures even 
outside the banking arena, however, such as when doubt arising over a market’s future 
liquidity triggers a stampede to sell first while the market is still liquid, thereby 
                                                 
120 These spiraling events may well occur rapidly, within days. See, e.g., Testimony of 
Richard Bookstaber before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial 
Services, Oct. 2, 2007, at 1 (observing the “tendency for the markets to move rapidly into 
a crisis mode,” and referring to this tendency, by analogy to engineering, as “tight 
coupling”), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ht1002072.shtml. See also 
Michael Mandel, The Economy’s Safety Valve, BUS. WK., Oct. 22, 2007, at 34, 37 
(quoting Professor Barry Eichengreen that “[t]he different components of the financial 
system are tightly linked to each other”). 
121 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1867-1960, at 311 (1963). Such a panic can occur, for example, when depositors 
“fear that means of payment will be unobtainable at any price.” Bordo et al, supra note 
24, at 7.  
122 Deposit Insurance, Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, Feb. 26, 2003 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve System), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2003/20030226/default.htm. 
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inadvertently destroying the market’s liquidity
123; or, as in the generic example of a 
systemic market meltdown,
124 when contractual counterparties rush to try to close out 
their positions, causing prices to drop so sharply that one or more capital markets stop 




Imposing regulation to help avert panics can facilitate the goal of stability. In the 
context of the above generic example, regulation might place conditions on closing 
                                                 
123 See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 121. 
124 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
125 To some extent this vicious cycle is exacerbated by the common requirement that a 
securities account be adjusted in response to a change in the market value of the 
securities. An investor, for example, may buy securities on credit from a securities 
broker-dealer, securing the purchase price by pledging the securities as collateral. To 
guard against the price of the securities falling to the point where their value as collateral 
is insufficient to repay the purchase price, broker-dealer requires the investor to maintain 
a minimum collateral value. If the market value of the securities falls below this 
minimum, the broker-dealer will issue a “margin call” requiring the investor to deposit 
additional collateral, usually in the form of money or additional securities, to satisfy this 
minimum. Failure to do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to foreclose on 
the collateral. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 78-79 (7th ed. 
2008). Requiring investors to “mark-to-market” in this fashion is generally believed to 
reduce systemic risk. See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou, The 
Asymmetric Relationship Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market 
Volatility Across Bull and Bear Markets, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1525, 1554–55 (2002) 
(finding a correlation between higher margin calls and decreased systemic risk, and 
speculating that higher margin calls may bleed the irrationality out of the market until 
only sound bets are left). Nonetheless, it can cause “perverse effects on systemic 
stability” during times of market turbulence, when forcing sales of assets to meet margin 
calls can depress asset prices, requiring more forced sales (which, in turn, will depress 
asset prices even more), causing the downward spiral. ” Cifuentes et al., supra note 65, at 
2. See also Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic Leverage: A Contingent 
Claims Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, J. Portfolio Mgmt., Fall 2004, at 
25, 28 (arguing that, in a bad market, short-term pressure to sell assets to raise cash for 
margin calls can lead to further mark-to-market losses for remaining assets, which 
triggers a whole new wave of selling, the process repeating itself until markets improve 
or the firm is wiped out; and referring to this process as a Critical Liquidation Cycle). 
The existence of leverage makes this cycle more likely and amplifies it if it occurs. Id. at 
26-27 (also explaining, id. at 37, that leverage decreases the amount of capital relative to 
potential cash obligations, and the Critical Liquidation Cycle begins whenever this equity 
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capital markets and provide liquidity to keep them open, thereby obviating the vicious 
cycle that would be triggered if one or more such markets stopped functioning. Had this 
type of regulation been in place in the late 1990s, some believe it would have alleviated 
the East Asian capital crisis of 1997-98.
126 Incongruously, sometimes stability can be 
achieved by closing down capital markets to halt price-drops,
127 though this can backfire 
by actually increasing investor panic.
128
 
  Any regulation aimed at preventing panics that trigger systemic risk, however, 
could fail to anticipate all the causes of these panics. A former Vice Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System believes, for example, that 
financial “panics can be set off by any number of things.”
129 Furthermore, even when 
identified, panics cannot always be easily averted. Consider, for example, price shocks 
that cause panics.
130 These shocks should not result from known risks because rational 
                                                                                                                                                 
falls below the level necessary to meet the firm’s obligations and equity cannot be raised 
by selling assets without incurring losses). 
126 Cf. Andrew Elek & Dominic Wilson, The East Asian Crisis and International Capital 
Markets, ASIAN-PACIFIC ECON. LITERATURE 1, 7 (May 1999) (describing investor 
withdrawal of capital and resulting large-scale insolvency due to market illiquidity). 
127 See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 103, at 782-83 (characterizing this approach as a “circuit 
breaker”). Capital markets in the United States, for example, were closed for this purpose 
following the 911 attacks. Margo McCall, Uncertainty Follows Tragedy, WIRELESS 
WEEK, Sep. 17, 2001, at 1. 
128 Partnoy, supra note 103, at 783 (arguing that closing down markets “may actually fuel 
panic,” and explaining that “there is no empirical evidence supporting this point, but it 
seems equally plausible that investor cognitive error would increase more during the 
period in which the circuit breaker [closing down the market] is in effect than it would 
have increased during a period of panic selling”). [Consider also any lessons to be 
gleaned from governmental reports of responses to the 1987 worldwide stock market 
drop break, in which the U.S. SEC Chairman (David Ruder) decided not to close the New 
York Stock Exchange but the Hong Kong stock market was closed by regulators. 
Professor Cox argues that the NYSE subsequently thrived, but it took years for the HK 
stock market’s trading volume to return. cite] 
129 See Eduardo Porter, Shanghai What-if: How a Shock Can Become a Shock Wave, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at WK3 (quoting observation by Alan Blinder, Princeton University 
economist and former Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Federal Reserve 
System). 
130 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 19, at 12 (observing that mispricing can lead to increased 
market vulnerability); Bordo et al., supra note 24, at 9 (discussing how “speculative 
mania” can turn into market crisis).  
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investors will price in the cost of those risks.
131 But investors are not always rational. 
Earlier this decade, “high-yield corporate bonds (formerly known as junk bonds) were 
able to attract investors only by offering interest rates eight to 10 percentage points higher 
than U.S. government bonds.”
132 By early 2007, however, high-yield bonds could attract 
investors by offering interest rates merely “little more than two percentage points” higher 
than government bonds.
133 Although the reason for this marked decline in the risk 
premium is unclear,
134 it may be attributable in part to the availability heuristic
135: 
investors became complacent after observing that “the bursting of the technology bubble 
of the 1990s failed to produce a global disaster.”
136 It may also be attributable to herd 
                                                 
131 Cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 446 (observing that investors, who are risk averse, will 
want to be compensated for risk that cannot be eliminated). 
132 Paul Krugman, Editorial, The Big Meltdown, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2007, at A17. 
133 Id. Internationally, the decline in the risk premium has been even more pronounced, 
with high-yield European bonds commanding nearly 16% interest in 2002 but recently 
less than 3%. Ravi Balakrishnan et al., Globalization, Gluts, Innovation or Irrationality: 
What Explains the Easy Financing of the U.S. Current Account Deficit? 12 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper No. 07/160, July 2007). 
134 Balakrishnan argues that the decline in the risk premium is due to a liquidity glut. See 
id. A participant in a faculty workshop suggested, anecdotally, that the decline might 
result from hedging, whereby risk gets spread out (cf. infra notes 161-167 and 
accompanying text, discussing hedging), risk-spreading would not appear to have more 
than a marginal effect on risk premiums. In the face of actual risk, well-informed hedging 
parties would themselves price in the risk and thereby require that amount to be paid as 
consideration by the hedged parties. The hedged parties, in turn, would have to pay that 
price out of the risk premium. This appears no different than banks diversifying risk 
through the sale of loan participations (see Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a 
Global Economy, 50 DUKE L. J. 1541, 1557-61 (2001), discussing loan participations), 
which does not significantly reduce the risk premium for borrowers since buyers of loan 
participations demand compensation for the portion of the risk they are assuming. This 
article later argues that spreading risk may well reduce systemic risk by reducing the 
chance that any given default will cause a chain of institutions to fail (see infra note 167 
and accompanying text), but it should not reduce risk within the financial system.  
135 Under the availability heuristic, people overestimate the frequency or likelihood of an 
event when examples of, or associations with, similar events are easily brought to mind. 
For example, people typically overestimate the divorce rate if they can quickly find 
examples of divorced friends. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts 
Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
136 Krugman, supra note 132. 
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behavior, which economists call the “bandwagon effect,”
137 under which investors follow 
the trends in markets and potentially overvalue or undervalue assets,




Furthermore, because the same trigger can foreshadow small consequences some 
times and large consequences other times, regulation intended to avert panics should 
attempt to take into account what it is beyond the triggering event that sorts the 
magnitude of the consequences, and should apply only to deter panics that trigger large 
consequences. It is questionable, though, whether such a sorting mechanism is always 
discernible ex ante.
140 Without such a sorting mechanism, regulation can impede market 
                                                 
137 See, e.g., THOMAS CARGILL, ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPANESE 
MONETARY POLICY 108 (date) (discussing this behavior and explaining that even when 
investors believe prices are abnormally high, they may invest further under the 
assumption that prices will rise for some time and they will be the first to sell before 
prices fall). 
138 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (discussing this phenomenon). 
139 A famous example of irrational investment arose out of the tulip trade in 17
th century 
Holland. Certain tulips were highly prized and sold for thousands of guilder. Almost 
everyone got caught up in the excitement of buying and selling tulip bulbs, usually on 
credit and with the intention of making a quick profit. When the market finally crashed, 
many who speculated on credit were left with crushing debts. Sam Segal, Tulips 
Portrayed: The Tulip Trade in Holland in the 17th Century, in THE TULIP: A SYMBOL OF 
TWO NATIONS 17–20 (Michael Roding & Hans Theunissen eds., 1993). Irrational 
investment trends can start quite easily. If, for example, a particular stock unexpectedly 
gains in value, the losers (e.g., those shorting the stock) will tend to withdraw from that 
market and the winners will tend to increase their investment, driving up the price even 
further. Soon other winners are attracted to the stock and other losers cut their losses and 
stop shorting the stock. This process is aided by almost inevitable explanations of why it 
is “rational” for the price to keep going up and why the traditional relationship of price to 
earnings does not apply. Even investors who recognize the bubble as irrational may buy 
in, hoping to sell at the height of the bubble before it bursts. Id. at 181. In these ways, 
price movements can become somewhat self-sustaining. BOOKSTABER, supra note 69, at 
169–70. 
140 In a banking context, some scholars argue that the degree of information asymmetry 
within a given banking system is the main determinant of whether a similar trigger event 
will lead to a small panic or a large one, and that systems with large or heavily 
interconnected banks are less likely, because of institutional system-wide self-monitoring 
(and correspondingly less information asymmetry among system participants), to 
experience large panics, whereas systems characterized by small and highly independent 
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growth or undermine the market experimentation and innovation on which growth 
depends. For example, an underlying cause of the recent subprime mortgage-related crisis 
was that mortgage loans turned out to be undercollateralized, due to the drop in home 
prices.
141 One could deter a similar future crisis by regulating a collateral-value 
restriction on mortgage loans, perhaps akin to that imposed on so-called “margin” loans 
after the Great Depression.
142 Mortgage lenders would then have to discount home values 
to anticipate the possibility of falling home prices. But that would not only significantly 
impede the growth in home ownership but also impose a high administrative cost on 
lenders as well as on government employees monitoring the regulation.  
 
Disclosure.  Another potential prophylactic approach is disclosure. Disclosing 
risks traditionally has been viewed, at least under U.S. securities laws, as the primary 
market-regulatory mechanism.
143 It works by reducing, if not eliminating, asymmetric 
information among market players, making the risks transparent to all.
144 It therefore 
might seem that financial panics would be minimized in a world of perfect disclosure 
                                                                                                                                                 
banks lack the means for effective self-monitoring. Gary Gortona & Lixin Huang, Bank 
Panics and the Endogeneity of Central Banking, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 1613, 1627-
28 (May 2005). Outside of banking, however, there is uncertainty. If a particular financial 
system is linear, like a tree of dominoes, it should be possible to calculate possible 
consequences. See BOOKSTABER, supra note 69, at 155–56. But if the system is non-
linear, like the weather, even minute changes in the triggering event could lead to large 
macro differences in the outcome, making it difficult to calculate long-term 
consequences. Id. at 228-30. 
141 [cite] 
142 This collateral-value restriction on margin loans is imposed under Regulations G, U, 
T, and X [cite], which require a two-to-one collateral-value-to-loan ratio on loans to 
purchase margin (i.e., publicly-traded) stock, secured by such stock. 
143 Greg Lumelsky, Does Russia Need a Securities Law?, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 111, 
122-23 (Fall 1997) (observing that “[s]ince before the New Deal, the U.S. philosophy of 
securities regulation has been based on the provision of continuous, accurate, public 
disclosure as a remedy against fraud and as a way to reduce risk associated with the 
purchase and sale of securities”). 
144 Id. 
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because investors would price in all risks.
145 Indeed, the government report issued after 
LTCM’s near-failure recommended increased public disclosure by hedge funds.
146  
 
In the context of systemic risk, however, individual market participants who fully 
understand that risk will be motivated to protect themselves but not the system as a 
whole.
147 Requiring non-public entities such as hedge or private-equity funds to disclose 
their financial condition or leverage would thus do relatively little to deter systemic risk, 
since investors or counterparties of those entities are unlikely to care about that disclosure 
to the extent it pertains to systemic risk.
148 Furthermore, those investors and 
counterparties already demand, and usually receive, disclosure to the extent it helps them 
assess the merits of their investments, qua investments.
149
 
Imposing additional disclosure requirements may even prove counterproductive, 
causing market participants to change their behavior. Thus, traders may become more 




                                                 
145 Cf. supra note 131 (indicating that investors will want to be compensated for risk that 
cannot be eliminated). 
146 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (likening systemic risk to a tragedy of 
the commons). 
148 Cf. Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their 
Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (1998) (arguing that improved disclosure would not 
have prevented hedge-fund problems). 
149 [cite] [Query the extent it would help manage systemic risk if government received 
full disclosure of such otherwise non-public information, even if such disclosure would 
not operatively reduce systemic risk. To this extent, government could keep the disclosed 
information confidential except as aggregate figures. Cite1]  
150 BOOKSTABER, supra note 69, at 221. Cf. Romano, supra note 148 (arguing that if 
government imposes too much regulation, less experienced investors might be lulled into 
engaging in derivatives trading). 
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The efficacy of disclosure is further limited by the increasing complexity of 
transactions and markets.
151 A contributing factor to the recent subprime crisis, for 
example, is allegedly that “[a] lot of institutional investors bought [mortgage-backed] 
securities substantially based on their ratings [without fully understanding what they 
bought], in part because the market has become so complex.”
152 The complexity 
increases to the extent derivatives are involved; it has been argued that investment 
strategies utilizing derivative instruments are so complex that, even if disclosure is 
provided, sophisticated investors (or regulators) might not be able to fully appreciate the 
risk of any given strategy.
153 This risk can be significant since derivatives can allow 
leverage up to 1,000 times the amount of capital put down.
154  
 
This article does not purport to resolve the ongoing broader debate of whether to 
regulate derivatives, absent effective disclosure.
155 In the context of systemic risk, 
however, the issue of derivatives regulation is best viewed as bifurcated: regulation of 
derivatives used for speculation, and regulation of derivatives used for hedging. 
Derivatives used for speculation are thought to increase the potential for systemic risk.
156 
                                                 
151 See Schwarcz, supra note 138 (arguing that the increasing complexity of transactions 
and markets is making disclosure less able to reduce information asymmetry, and that 
supplementary approaches should be sought to reduce such asymmetry). 
152 Credit & Blame: How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
15, 2007, at A1 (quoting a market observer). See also Daniel Andrews, The Clean Up: 
Investors Need Better Advice on Structured Finance Products, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 14, 
14 (Sept. 2007) (observing that “[i]nvestors have the prospectuses to rely on, but the 
reality is that they have not taken any responsibility for reading the detail of the 
documentation or digesting the risks involved”). 
153 See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at xix & 231 (arguing that derivatives are too 
complex for regulators to understand the extent of the risks they create, and that 
disclosure alone will not enable investors to understand the risks). 
154 Adam R. Waldman, Comment, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance 
or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1055–56 (1994). [Why is there 
1,000x leverage, and should leverage be regulated per the discussion below of limiting 
leverage? Cite] 
155 For an analysis of that larger debate, see Romano, supra note 148. 
156 See, e.g., Michel Aglietta, Financial Market Failures and Systemic Risk 7–12, 15–26 
(Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales, Working Paper No. 
1996–01, 1996); Michael R. Darby, Over-The-Counter Derivatives and Systemic Risk to 
the Global Financial System 6–18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4801, 
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Recently-enacted derivatives netting provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
157 
however, are aimed at mitigating this risk.
158 The extent to which these netting provisions 
will be effective to reduce systemic risk is ultimately an empirical question.
159
 
Derivatives used for hedging, in contrast, may actually reduce the potential for 
systemic risk.
160 Hedging is intended to protect institutions from risk by using credit 
derivatives to diversify that risk.
161 The most widely used derivative instrument for this 
purpose is the credit-default swap, under which one party agrees, in exchange for 
                                                                                                                                                 
1994); Ludger Hentschel & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Risks in Derivatives Markets: 
Implications for the Insurance Industry, 64 J. RISK & INS. 323, 342 (1997); Frank Partnoy 
& David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Peril of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1019, 1040 (2007) (all arguing that derivatives can increase risk if they are used for 
speculation rather than hedging). But cf. Ludger Hentschel & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 
Derivatives Regulation: Implications for Central Banks, 40 J. MON. ECON. 305, 320–23 
(1997) & Myron S. Scholes, Global Financial Markets, Derivatives Securities, and 
Systemic Risks, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 271, 277–85 (1996) (arguing that derivatives 
reduce systemic risk).  
157 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 546. These derivatives netting provisions apply to all 
derivatives, whether used for speculation or for hedging. 
158 See, e.g., Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New 
Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 642, 647, 660, & 663 (2005); Enron Corp. v. J.P. Morgan 
Sec., 325 B.R. 671, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Rhett G. Campbell, Financial Markets 
Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697 passim (2005); Christopher J. Redd, 
Treatment of Securities and Derivatives Transactions in Bankruptcy, Part I, 24-6 ABIJ 
36, 37 (2005). [Explain in text how these netting provisions mitigate systemic risk. Cite] 
159 It should be noted in this context that the potential for systemic risk from derivatives, 
absent these bankruptcy netting provisions, primarily results from other U.S. 
bankruptcy law provisions that generally impose an automatic stay and invalidate ipso 
facto clauses. [cite] Although the insolvency laws of few if any foreign countries 
include netting provisions for derivatives, such provisions may be unnecessary to the 
extent those laws lack terms imposing automatic stays or invalidating ipso facto 
clauses. Foreign derivatives contracts, on the other hand, may engender other concerns, 
such as whether such contracts are enforceable or, instead, illegal as gambling 
contracts. Interview with Michael Crystal, Q.C., at the International Insolvency 
Institute’s seventh annual conference’s panel, “Understanding Derivatives: Dissecting 
Complex Financial Instruments,” June 12, 2007 (observing that, outside the U.S., there 
are “huge” re-characterization and fraud risks in credit derivatives”). 
160 [Query also whether derivatives used for hedging are more transparent than those used 
for speculation, and/or are used by parties more sophisticated in their use. Cite] 
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receiving a fee paid by a second party, to assume the credit risk of certain debt 
obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. If a “credit event” (for example, 
default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of that obligor, the first party will either (i) pay 
the second party an amount calculated by reference to post-default value of the debt 
obligations or (ii) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible debt obligations of the 
obligor) for their full face value from the second party.
162  
 
Hedging is also effected through risk securitization, in which a company, bank, or 
other entity (a “hedged party”) transfers the credit risk of a portfolio of corporate loans, 
bonds or other debt obligations to a special-purpose vehicle (“SPV”). The SPV raises 
funds to support that assumption of risk by issuing securities to investors in the capital 
markets. The SPV agrees to make certain predetermined payments to the hedged party if 
the credit risk of the portfolio increases (as determined by the default or bankruptcy of 
the borrowers or other parties obligated to the hedged party respecting debt obligations in 
the portfolio). Because any such payments would reduce the SPV’s assets from which 
investors receive repayment of their securities, investors are exposed to the credit risk of 
the portfolio. In return for assuming this risk, the hedged party pays the SPV fees that are 
applied, along with the SPV’s other assets, to repay the investors at a rate-of-return 
appropriate to the risk.
163   
 
These hedging strategies facilitate risk-spreading to parties better able to bear the 
risks, including the “deep pockets” of the global capital markets.
164 This diversification of 
risk also reduces the likelihood that a default will cause any given institution to fail, and 
mitigates the impact of any such failure on other institutions—not unlike the effect of 
limiting financial-exposure limits.
165 On the other hand, diversifying risk through hedging 
increases linkages among market participants which, at least in part, could offset the risk 
                                                                                                                                                 
161 See Yamaguchi, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing the rise of credit derivatives). See also 
Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 156. 
162 STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION 12-14 n. 37 (3d ed., supplemented through March 2007). 
163 See SCHWARCZ, supra note 162, Chap. 12. 
164 See infra note 206. 
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spreading and foster systemic risk. If an institution fails, it would potentially impact 
many more other institutions. Furthermore, hedging strategies sometimes fail,
166 and 
diversification increases the chance that some market participants may not fully 
understand the risks they are taking on. The net effect of hedging strategies, however, 
appears to be a positive reduction of risk.
167   
 
Requiring additional disclosure would thus appear to do relatively little to 
mitigate the potential for systemic risk, even to the extent that potential results from the 
use of derivatives.  
 
Financial-Exposure Limits.  The failure of one or more large institutions (such as 
a large hedge fund, like LTCM) could create defaults large enough to de-stabilize other 
highly-leveraged investors,
168 increasing the likelihood of a systemic market meltdown 
(as illustrated by the generic example
169). This suggests another possible approach to 
                                                                                                                                                 
165 See infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text. 
166 For example, convergent hedging strategies could concentrate rather than diversify 
risk. Cf. supra note 50 (noting the danger of convergent investment strategies). Hedging 
strategies are sometimes also unrealistic and, as illustrated by LTCM, can fail 
spectacularly when market liquidity dries up. Waldman, supra note 50. [Consider here 
whether hedging strategies should be fostered through regulation, or whether such 
strategies are best left to the market, and whether market-generated hedging strategies 
should be regulated. cite] 
167 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Federal Reserve System, 
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Forty-first Annual Conference on 
Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial Stability (May 5, 2005) (transcript available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm) 
(arguing that hedging can create net protection); DAVIS, supra note 19, at 272 (arguing 
that although “derivatives have increased linkages between market segments, [causing] 
disruption in one [market] to more readily feed into others,” spreading the risk “more 
widely across the financial system [] may help to diffuse financial instability and prevent 
systemic risk”). Cf. Cifuentes et al., supra note 65, at 24-26 (finding a “non-linear 
response to a shock with respect to a number of [bank] interlinkages” in that a credit 
structure diversified among two or three banks can trigger, in the case of a bank’s default, 
significant systemic contagion to other banks whereas that “contagion disappears when 
the number of linkages is high enough to allow banks to stand the losses without selling 
illiquid assets”). 
168 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
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regulation: placing limits on inter-institution financial exposure.
170 Financial-exposure 
limits would facilitate stability by diversifying risk, in effect by reducing the losses of 
any given contractual counterparty and thus the likelihood that such losses would cause 
the counterparty to fail. Such limits also might reduce the urgency, and hence the panic, 
that contractual counterparties feel about closing out their positions.
171
 
This approach already applies to banks through lending limits, which restrict the 
amount of bank exposure to any given customer’s risk.
172 Its application beyond banks to 
other financial institutions is potentially appealing given the “definite trend toward a 
blurring of the lines between . . . banks and non-bank financial institutions”
173 and the 
high volumes of financial assets circulating among non-bank financial entities.
174 
Evidence even suggests that non-bank institutions are already adopting risk measures 
common to banks. An IMF Deputy Director has observed that many non-bank entities, 
including conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs), are proactively limiting 
                                                 
170 The government report issued after LTCM’s near-failure recommended a weak variant 
on this approach: increased disclosure by public companies of exposures to highly-
leveraged hedge funds. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
171 Cf. supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (discussing, in the context of the 
generic example, how contractual counterparties rush to try to close out or otherwise 
protect their positions after a large hedge fund or private-equity company defaults).  
172 Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: a Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. 
L.J. 323, 370 (2007). Lending limits apply to both individual bank customers and lending 
between banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 308, 12 U.S.C. § 371 B-2 (1991). 
173 JOE REIF, SERVICES: THE EXPORT OF THE 21ST CENTURY, 58 (1997). See also Timothy 
F. Geithner, Speech before the Conference on Systemic Financial Crises at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches 
/2004/gei041001.html (“There has also been a substantial convergence in the types of 
financial transactions bank-centered and non-bank affiliated financial intermediaries 
perform.”); Stijn Claessens, Benefits and Costs of Integrated Financial Services 
Provision in Developing Countries, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 85, 
106 n.50 (2003) (“Non-bank financial institutions, not just banks, have the potential to be 
sources of systemic risk . . . [because] [i]n many countries, information service providers, 
such as credit card companies, provide near-banking services . . . [and] non-banks are 
offering forms of payment services” that resemble services provided by banks). 
174 U.S. non-bank financial intermediaries, which are not regulated under the same 
constraints applied to banks, account for most of the assets of financial institutions 
Geithner, supra note 173. 
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However, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, in championing a market-
based, invisible hand approach to regulation,
176 has rejected the suggestion that 
government should enforce financial exposure limits on financial institutions, specifically 
hedge funds.
177 Bernanke believes that large financial institutions that lend to hedge 
funds naturally “seek to protect themselves against large losses through risk management 
and risk mitigation . . . includ[ing] the use of stress tests to estimate potential exposure 
under adverse market conditions.”
178 Moreover, Bernanke argues, their incentives “line 
up well with regulators’ objectives, which include not only constraining excess risk-
taking by hedge funds but also preventing losses that would threaten the stability of other 
major financial market participants.”
179 Empirical research supports focusing on the risk 




                                                 
175 See John Lipsky, Through the Looking Glass: The Links Between Financial 
Globalization and Systemic Risk, available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/092707.htm. 
176 See Ben S. Bernanke, Financial Regulation and the Invisible Hand, Speech at the New 
York University Law School, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/bernanke20070411a.htm (observing that while “targeted government regulation 
and intervention can sometimes benefit the economy . . . the market itself can often be 
used to achieve regulatory objectives”).  
177 Id. (noting that hedge fund counterparties–most notably large commercial and 
investment banks–are creditors with “a clear economic incentive to monitor and perhaps 
impose limits on hedge funds’ risk-taking, as well as an incentive to protect themselves 
form large losses should one or more of their hedge-fund customers fail”).   
178 Id.   
179 Id.  
180 See Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Update: Research and Statistics 
Group, “Contemporary Credit Risk Management is Best Defense Against Systemic Risk 
Linked to Hedge Funds” (Oct. 2007), http://www.ny.frb.org/research/research_update 
/10_07up.pdf (citing research indicating that “despite unique risk challenges posed by 
hedge funds, the practices used by financial institutions to manage counterparty credit 
risk are still the best starting point for limiting the funds’ potential for generating 
systemic disruptions”).   
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Reducing Leverage.  Reducing leverage is relevant to systemic risk insofar as it 
reduces the risk that a financial entity fails in the first place and also reduces the 
likelihood “that problems at one financial institution could be transmitted to other 
institutions.”
181 Absent leverage, institutions can absorb losses linearly, dollar for dollar. 
Institutions may shrink, but they would not default on debt. The less leverage, the less 




High leverage, however, can cause institutions to absorb losses “exponentially” in 
the sense that losses beyond a certain level (depending on the institution’s size and 
leverage) will precipitously degrade an institution’s ability to pay its debts. Default in 
paying debts might well cause the institution’s failure,
183 as well as trigger a potential 
chain of defaults as other institutions are not paid amounts owed them (and in turn, if 
highly leveraged, such other institutions might then be unable to pay amounts owed to yet 
other institutions).  
 
Reducing leverage is therefore primarily prophylactic, reducing the risk and 
mitigating the spread and consequences of systemic collapse.
184 Reducing leverage would 
also strongly facilitate the goal of stability. It nonetheless could create significant costs. 
                                                 
181 Cover letter included at beginning of  PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP, supra note 7 
(observing that “excessive leverage can increase the likelihood of a general breakdown in 
the functioning of financial markets” by increasing the likelihood of transmitting 
problems). 
182 DAVIS, supra note 19, at 40 (concluding that “increased corporate debt in relation to 
equity, assets or cash flow is likely to lead to a greater probability of bankruptcy”). 
183 Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (discussing failure to pay debts as the basis for involuntary 
bankruptcy). 
184 Reducing leverage also occurs reactively insofar as investors experiencing a financial 
collapse will be more cautious and thus incur less leverage in the future. This, however, is 
a reaction to, not a means of mitigating, the collapse, and it does not reduce the harm that 
has been caused. Moreover, those investors may well, over time, fall into the pattern of 
alternating skittishness and optimism discussed infra notes 244-247 and accompanying 
text, so that lessons about leverage learned from a collapse are eventually disregarded. 
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Some leverage is good,
185 though there is no optimal across-the-board amount of leverage 
that is right for every company.
186 Regulation that attempts to track optimal leverage thus 
would be nuanced and highly complex, as illustrated by the complexity of the Basel II 
capital adequacy requirements discussed above. These requirements, designed to reduce 
the leverage of banks, mandate that banks hold minimum amounts of capital as a function 
of the riskiness of their assets.
187 It has been observed, however, that “the advanced 
approaches of Basel II are ‘too complex’ for anyone to understand, and the mathematical 
formulas in various drafts of the framework can look like a foreign language to some 
readers.”
188 Imposing unnunanced limitations on leverage, however, could impair a 
firm’s ability to operate efficiently and impede economic growth.
189   
                                                 
185 For example, at least in the U.S., interest paid on debt is tax deductible whereas a 
dividend paid on equity is not. Also, the cost of debt is usually lower than the cost of 
equity because debt is a less risky investment than equity. See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 
40. 
186 According to financing “trade-off” theory, the optimal amount of leverage is 
determined by the amount of tax-breaks and other benefits received for debt assumed 
relative to the costs of that debt. James L. Berens & Charles J. Cuny, The Capital 
Structure Puzzle Revisited, 8 REV. FIN. STUD. 1185, 1185 (1995). Moderate leverage may 
prove beneficial, but too much leverage will hurt a company and its valuation. See 
Murillo Campello, Debt Financing: Does it Boost or Hurt Firm Performance in Product 
Markets?, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 168 (2006). 
187 See supra notes 93-94 & 101-103 and accompanying text. 
188 Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks Before the Institute of 
International Bankers (Sept. 26, 2005). 
189 Cf. supra note 185. [Consider possibly reducing leverage permitted by derivatives. Cf. 
supra note 154. Small institutional failures are unlikely to result in failures to pay 
amounts large enough to trigger other institutional defaults, so any limitations on 
leverage should probably be applied only to large firms (but might that violate equal 
protection under the U.S. Constitution?). Consider also the efficacy of a reducing-
leverage approach in that structured finance can be used to mask leverage, comparing 
Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 
2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose Entities, 
and Transparency of Filings by Issuers (June 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/soxoffbalancerpt.pdf. This SEC staff report focused, 
among other things, on whether financial statements of issuers of securities transparently 
reflect the economics of off-balance-sheet arrangements, recommending that 
“transactions and transaction structures primarily motivated by accounting and reporting 
concerns, rather than economics” be discouraged through a combination of changes to 
accounting standards and greater awareness by participants in the financial reporting 
process. Id. at 3.] 
SystemicRisk_repost2-08.doc   44
 
Ensuring Liquidity.  Ensuring liquidity could facilitate stability in two ways: by 
providing liquidity to prevent financial entities from defaulting (or to prevent defaulting 
financial entities from failing
190), and by providing liquidity to capital markets as 
necessary to keep them functioning.
191 This would strengthen these two key links in the 
systemic meltdown chain,
192 thereby strongly facilitating the goal of stability. To the 
extent liquidity averts a collapse, it functions prophylactically; but its primarily function 
is reactive, to mitigate the spread and consequences of systemic collapse.  
 
There are at least two possible regulatory ways to ensure liquidity: creating a 
lender/market-maker of last resort (hereinafter, generically, a “liquidity provider of last 
resort”), and imposing entity-level liquidity requirements.
193 In the former context, 
economists argue that monetary contractions can occur when market crashes engender 
fears that lenders will lack resources to extend loans.
194 However, panic will not usually 
become contagious (and thus systemic), they contend, when a lender of last resort 
provides adequate liquidity.
195 Thus, in the case of the Great Depression, the negative 
                                                 
190 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 80, at 444-45 (discussing lack of liquidity as the primary 
cause of bankruptcy). 
191 See infra notes 216-224 and accompanying text. This also responds directly to the 
crux of a systemic collapse since systemic risk is [largely] a liquidity phenomenon: 
market systemic risk is systemic risk that impairs market liquidity, and institutional 
systemic risk is, at least to the extent it involves banks, systemic risk that impairs 
money liquidity. 
192 Cf. supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text (describing these links in the generic 
example). 
193 The “liquidity injection” by the U.S. Federal Reserve, in response to the recent 
subprime mortgage crisis, did not actually ensure liquidity but merely provided a more 
attractive borrowing environment for banks. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, The Basics: The 
Banks Roll Up Their Sleeves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, Wk. in Rev., at 2 (observing 
that when the Federal Reserve makes “liquidity injections” into the banking system, “the 
Fed doesn’t even use real money,” and explaining that liquidity results from offering Fed 
loans to banks at the discount rate, a lower interest rate than the “fed funds rate” that 
banks would charge other banks on interbank loans). Moreover, that “liquidity injection” 
affected only banks, not financial markets, directly. See supra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
194 Bordo et al, supra note 24, at 19. 
195 Id. 
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effects would have been considerably muted (they argue) through actions by the 




Establishing a liquidity provider of last resort could be an expensive proposition, 
potentially creating moral hazard and shifting cost to taxpayers.
197 It also could foster 
adverse selection. Nonetheless, these costs may be controllable. The discussion below 
considers controlling these costs first in the context of providing liquidity to institutions 
by making loans, then in the context of providing liquidity to markets by purchasing 
securities.   
 
In the first context, the moral-hazard cost could be controlled, for example, by 
following a policy of “constructive ambiguity” under which the liquidity provider of last 
resort would have the right but not the obligation to intervene, and the rules by which it 
decides which to do would be uncertain to third parties.
198 Additional ways to control 
moral hazard might include setting qualification criteria for borrowing and repayment 
incentives for borrowers,
199 and requiring coinsurance.
200 And adverse selection costs 
                                                 
196 See id. at 21. 
197 Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 961-66 (2000) (discussing the moral hazard and 
other costs created when the IMF acts as a lender of last resort to financially-troubled 
nations); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance 
Problems of Banks: a Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 328-29 (Apr. 2003) (discussing 
banks “foist[ing] some of their losses onto . . . the federal taxpayers whose funds 
replenish the federal insurance fund when it is depleted”); Partnoy, supra note 103, at 
757-84 (discussing moral hazard in the context of market crashes and lenders of last 
resort). 
198 See Partnoy, supra note 103, at 784 (suggesting this approach); DAVIS, supra note 19, 
at 123 (“An essential feature [of a liquidity provider of last resort] is that its operation 
should be uncertain for any particular institution in difficulties . . . .”). 
199 Tobias Knedlik, Implementing an International Lender of Last Resort 9–10 (Halle 
Inst. for Econ. Research, IWH-Discussion Paper No. 20, 2006). Qualification criteria 
could include predictors related to the chance of default, such as bank independence and 
the presence of corruption. Repayment incentives may include disqualification for future 
help or “interest rate discounts for fast repayments.” Id. at 10. 
200 Gregory Moore, Solutions to the Moral Hazard Problem Arising from the Lender-Of-
Last-Resort Facility, 13 J. ECON. SURV. 443, 470 (1999). Another approach to controlling 
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could be controlled by gathering information on and evaluating potential borrowers, 
limiting the criteria by which loans are disbursed, and imposing covenants and limitations 
on use of proceeds.
201
 
Any shifting of costs to taxpayers could also be controlled. Rather than using 
taxation to establish the pool of funds from which the liquidity provider of last resort 
could make advances, the pool could be funded, for example, by charging “premiums” to 
market participants, not unlike insurance. FDIC deposit insurance, for example, is 
financed in this way.
202 Even if the pool of funds is raised by taxes, the funds could be 
invested to maintain their value until used, and loans could be advanced at a market 
interest rate. The failure of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), when acting as a 
lender of last resort to sovereign states, to charge a market interest rate on its loans is 
precisely what shifts costs to the taxpayers of IMF member-nations, who fund the 
loans.
203 That failure, however, is political and not inherent in the concept of a lender of 
last resort.
204   
                                                                                                                                                 
moral hazard—shaming those who need to borrow from a liquidity provider of last resort, 
see id.—is likely to backfire since society wants the borrowing to occur to avoid systemic 
risk. 
201 See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services 
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 228 (2002). Another approach to mitigate adverse selection is to require risk-
prone participants to pay their fair share of the burden. Cf. Henri Pagès & David 
Humphrey, Settlement Finality as a Public Good in Large-Value Payment Systems 5 
(Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 506, 2005), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp506.pdf (discussing how the adverse selection 
problem is resolved in Europe’s lender-of-last-resort approach to settlement finality). 
202 Kenneth B. Noble, New Deal Bank Acts Turn 50, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1983, at D1 
(“The F.D.I.C. is financed by premiums paid by insured banks. Each bank is assessed 
one-twelfth of 1 percent of its insured deposits. Accounts are insured for up to $100,000 
each, although the agency commonly will reimburse depositors for more.”). [How might 
this charging-premium approach work, and what might be the premium costs? Cite] 
203 See, e.g., Adam Lerrick, Funding the IMF: How Much Does it Really Cost?, 
QUARTERLY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS REPORT, Nov. 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/11-18-03.pdf (observing that IMF participation is 
estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers $1.9 billion annually because IMF loans have artificially 
low interest rates); Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 963-64 (discussing how the IMF raises 
money from taxpayers of member-nations) & at 965-66 (observing that the return to IMF 
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Yet another way to avoid shifting costs to taxpayers is to privatize the role of the 
liquidity provider of last resort, or at least to reallocate the source of liquidity-funding 
from taxpayers to private credit and other capital markets.
205 Shifting the source of 
funding to capital markets would eliminate the need for taxpayers to pay for the funding 
since the size of these markets should be large enough to accommodate the legitimate 
financing needs of troubled institutions.
206 Such a shift also would significantly reduce 
the problem of moral hazard because, notwithstanding the size of these markets, an 
institution will have no assurance that private credit will be available.
207 The risk of 
potential default will make institutions more cautious. Furthermore, as explained 
below,
208 any conditions that a government-sponsored liquidity provider of last resort 
imposes to minimize moral hazard could be similarly imposed in a capital-market 
context.  
 
  As a practical matter, this approach could only work if capital-market financiers 
obtained priority on their new loans to troubled institutions. Without a priority, the 
information asymmetry between the institution and potential financiers would likely be 
too large; after all, the institution will be collapsing, and time will be of the essence to 
avoid a systemic meltdown. A priority also will be needed because new-money financiers 
                                                                                                                                                 
member-nations is not only “less than a market rate of interest” but, “[i]n some cases, . . . 
even below the member-State’s own cost of funds”).   
204 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 965 n. 45 (observing that “[o]nly a foolish investor 
would seek a rate of return that is equal to or less than its cost of funds”). 
205 Privatization might even occur indirectly. Cf. Smith, Mollenkamp, Perry, & Ip, supra 
note 4, at A8 (observing that, in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, several large 
banks in the United States “discussed with the Federal Reserve Bank the possibility of 
borrowing a total of $75 billion to be used to buy” mortgage-backed securities, to support 
their value). 
206 The global capital markets had approximately $65 trillion debt securities outstanding 
as of September 30, 2006. Bank for International Settlements, BIS QUARTERLY REV. 
A85-A100 (Dec. 2006). See also Moisés Naím, Mexico’s Larger Story, 99 FOREIGN 
POL’Y 112, 122-23 (1995) (“Today, the magnitude of the funds controlled by private 
investment managers makes the volumes typically supplied by the IMF and the World 
Bank almost irrelevant.”). 
207 Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 987 & 993. 
208 See infra note 216 and accompanying text. 
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would not want to be “taxed” by the claims of existing creditors.
209 The law could create 
priorities in many ways, but the simplest is perhaps a statutorily-mandated priority not 
unlike that set forth in bankruptcy law to attract new-money financing to help reorganize 
troubled companies.
210   
 
  Giving priority to new-money financiers might create costs, most significantly by 
effectively subordinating the institution’s existing unsecured creditors, thereby affecting 
ex-ante lending incentives and potentially driving up the cost of credit. This cost, 
however, should be minimal for two reasons. First, even a government-sponsored 
liquidity provider of last resort is likely to demand priority,
211 so privatizing the funding 
would likely not create costs beyond that created by any liquidity-provider-of-last-resort 
scheme. Second, granting priority to attract new-money credit “tends to create value for 
unsecured creditors,” even where those creditors’ claims are subordinated to the new 
money,
212 since credit increases a borrower’s liquidity, thereby reducing its risk of failure 
and increasing the expected value of unsecured claims.
213  
 
  New-money credit nonetheless could decrease value to unsecured creditors if 
overinvestment occurs.
214 Monitoring, though, can limit the risk of overinvestment.
215 
Any law authorizing a priority therefore should enable existing creditors to scrutinize and 
                                                 
209 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 986 (discussing similar reasons why a priority would 
be needed in a sovereign-debt restructuring context to attract financing). 
210 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (authorizing priorities for so-called “DIP,” or debtor-in-
possession, loans). 
211 Even the IMF, when acting as a lender of last resort to sovereign nations, has priority 
over the nation’s existing creditors. Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 988. 
212 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 
47 DUKE L.J. 425, 425 (1997). Although that article deals with secured lending priorities, 
its argument applies equally to any set of lending priorities that arise merely by operation 
of law. 
213 See id. at 430. 
214 In this context, overinvestment means that a borrower invests proceeds of the new 
money credit in a project that is less valuable than the proceeds. If the borrower fails, the 
prior creditors will suffer losses. 
215 Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 989-90.  
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object to excessive amounts of new-money priority financing and to monitor its use as 
appropriate. 
 
Under what conditions should the law authorize the priority (and concomitant 
monitoring)? Although the law could attempt to specify those conditions in advance, 
determining when a failing institution is likely, absent liquidity, to trigger a systemic 
meltdown is probably a judgment call that should be decided in light of all the 
circumstances. A neutral government-sponsored agency could be assigned this decision-
making role. It might then be possible to combine the best of both worlds by enabling the 
decision-making agency to disburse the capital-market funds through non-recourse back-
to-back lending, in which the agency borrows funds from the capital markets on a non-
recourse basis and re-lends those funds to the institution, assigning the institution’s 
priority loan to the capital-market financiers as collateral.
216  
 
The foregoing examination focused on a liquidity provider of last resort providing 
liquidity to institutions by making loans. Consider next providing liquidity to markets by 
purchasing securities.
217 This is different in at least three ways: (i) it is less obvious who 
would request that liquidity be provided; (ii) it is less clear how priority would be 
achieved on the purchased securities; and (iii) because markets themselves would be at 
issue, it is dubious that capital markets would be sufficiently robust, at the time, as a 
source of privatized funding.
218  
 
The first difference is not problematic since a government agency could decide 
when liquidity should be provided. The second difference is likewise surmountable. For 
                                                 
216 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 197, at 990 (suggesting a similar approach for the IMF to 
disburse capital-market funds, as a lender of last resort, to troubled nations). As a credit 
matter, the lenders would be in the same position as if they had made the loan directly to 
the institution. Id. at 990 & 990 n. 199. 
217 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 19, at 268 (suggesting there may be a need for a “market maker 
of last resort” to protect financial markets). 
218 Cf. Allaudeen Hameed, Wenjin Kang & S. Viswanathan, Stock Market Declines and 
Liquidity 34 (March 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that 
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example, the law could grant the liquidity provider of last resort a priority in the 
purchased securities over other securities of that type. Thus, a liquidity provider of last 
resort purchasing bonds of XYZ Corporation would, if provided by law, obtain priority of 
repayment over all other holders of XYZ bonds. Even without a priority, however, the 
liquidity provider of last resort could purchase market securities at a deep enough 
discount to ensure ultimate repayment. Buying at a discount would also help to reduce 
moral hazard without the need for a policy of constructive ambiguity to the extent prices 
stabilize well below the levels paid by speculating investors. The only question would be 
whether market prices stabilize at a sufficient level to preserve a robust market if the 
necessary discount is very large. 
 
One might ask why, if a liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a deep 
discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors won’t also do so, 
thereby eliminating the need for a liquidity provider of last resort. The answer at least in 
part is that individuals at investing firms will not want to jeopardize their reputations (and 
jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when other investors have abandoned the 




The third difference—that because markets themselves would be at issue, it is 
dubious that capital markets would be sufficiently robust as a source of funding—is less 
surmountable. There is, of course, a middle ground: look first to capital markets as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
market shocks affect all prices, with “many asset holders [being forced] to liquidate, 
making it difficult to provide liquidity precisely when the market demands it”). 
219 Cf. Paul M. Healy & Krishna Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in 
Capital Markets: Evidence from the Fall of Enron 26 (Aug. 15, 2002 draft, available at 
www.ssrn.com) (forthcoming [update cite to] J. ECON. PERSP.) (fund manager who 
estimates a stock is overvalued but does not act on this analysis “and simply follows the 
crowd” will not be rewarded for foreseeing the problems, “but neither will he be blamed 
for a poor investment decision when the stock ultimately crashes, since his peers made 
the same mistake”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral 
Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (2000) (discussing how herd behavior may have 
a reputational payoff even if the chosen course of action fails, and arguing that where 
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source of last resort funding, but maintain some backup source of taxpayer-funded 
liquidity in case market funding is unavailable.
220 In any event, the availability of 
privatized funding is less important to the extent the liquidity provider purchases 
securities with priority or at a deep discount, thereby ensuring repayment in either case. 
 
Nothing in this discussion of liquidity providers of last resort has necessarily 
differentiated between domestic and international liquidity demands. A threshold 
difference is identifying the entity that would act as liquidity provider of last resort.
221 
The Federal Reserve Bank appears to be best situated to act in that capacity in the U.S. 
domestic context, though its power to so act is ambiguous under existing law.
222 This 
article later examines who might act as an international liquidity-provider of last resort.
223
 
The other possible regulatory means to ensure liquidity is to impose entity-level 
liquidity requirements. Even in the banking context, however, these types of requirements 
are expensive,
224 and they would be even harder to apply and manage in a broader 
                                                                                                                                                 
“the action was consistent with approved conventional wisdom, the hit to the manager’s 
reputation from an adverse outcome is reduced”). 
220 To the extent these moneys are invested in market-rate securities, there should not be 
losses to taxpayers. 
221 Cf. Yamaguchi, supra note 8, at 3 (arguing in favor of augmenting the functions of 
central banks to act, at least nationally, as lenders of last resort for large non-bank 
institutions and conglomerates). See also Vikas Bajaj, Central Banks Intervene to Calm 
Volatile Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2007), at 1 (reporting on August 10, 2007 efforts 
by the European Central Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, and other central banks 
worldwide to coordinate liquidity infusions in their respective nations). 
222 To the extent the Federal Reserve Bank has this power, its source would be § 13(3) of 
the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. § 343), which, in “unusual and exigent 
circumstances,” enables “the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [to] 
authorize any Federal reserve bank . . . to discount for any individual, partnership, or 
corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange” if such individual, partnership, or 
corporation is “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking 
institutions.” Although this may well enable the Federal Reserve to fund failing 
institutions, it is dubious it enables the Fed to purchase securities in falling markets.  
223 See infra notes 325-332 and accompanying text. 
224 [cite] 
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context since the entities would be less uniform. Nor would entity-level liquidity 
requirements be applicable to ensuring market liquidity.
225
 
Ad Hoc Approaches.  The extent to which ad hoc (that is, purely reactive) 
regulatory responses to systemic risk facilitate stability and efficiency is, of course, partly 
dependent on what those responses turn out to be. Nonetheless, some general 
observations can be made. For example, ad hoc approaches do not always work. 
Sometimes they are too late and the harm has been done or no longer can be prevented, 
and sometimes there is insufficient time to fashion and implement an optimal solution. In 
these cases, ad hoc approaches do not strongly facilitate the goal of stability, and 
therefore are second-best.  
 
From an efficiency standpoint, ad hoc approaches can help to minimize the 
difficulties in measuring, and balancing, costs and benefits. It may be hard to quantify in 
advance, for example, the likelihood that the failure of a given firm or other triggering 
event would cause a systemic meltdown.
226 Because ad hoc approaches are ex post in 
nature—by definition, not initiated until the time of the potential failure—they can make 
quantification easier.
227 Furthermore, ad hoc approaches reduce moral-hazard cost to the 
extent an institution cannot know in advance whether, if it faces financial failure, it will 
be bailed out or fail.
228 For these reasons, central banks often pursue a policy of 
“constructive ambiguity” in setting criteria whether to bail out failing banks, effectively 
making the decision ex post on an ad hoc basis.
229
 
                                                 
225 [cite] 
226 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (observing that the same trigger can 
foreshadow small consequences some times and large consequences other times, and that 
a sorting mechanism may not always be discernible ex ante). 
227 Cf. BOOKSTABER, supra note 69, at 157 (arguing that in non-linear systems, 
improvised solutions may work better than set rules). 
228 Some institutions, though, may be “too big to fail,” and therefore incur moral hazard 
by anticipating a bailout. See infra note 229. 
229 Marcel Dabos, Too Big to Fail in the Banking Industry: A Survey, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: 
POLICIES AND PRACTICE IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 141 (Benton E. Gup, ed. 2004). 
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Market Discipline.  As the discussion of ad hoc approaches has shown, regulatory 
approaches to systemic risk do not have to be prescriptive ex ante. In a market context, 
moreover, they may not have to be prescriptive at all. Some amount of bank “regulation,” 
for example, is believed to be imposed by the market itself.
230 Market-imposed regulation 
is efficient insofar as it minimizes regulatory costs.
231  
 
Although in theory perfect markets would never need external regulation,
232 
actual markets, including financial markets, are not perfect. Under a market-discipline 
approach, the regulator’s job is to ensure that market participants exercise the type of 
diligence that enables the market to work efficiently.
233 This is often achieved by 
ensuring that market participants have access to adequate information about risks, and by 
arranging incentives so those who influence an institution’s behavior will suffer if that 
behavior generates losses.
234 This is the type of approach taken by the United States 
government under the second Bush administration to minimize hedge-fund failure and 
the resulting possibility of systemic risk.
235
                                                 
230 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors, U.S. Federal Reserve 
System, Remarks at the New York University Law School, New York, New York (Apr. 
11, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2007/20070411/default.htm) 
(discussing both the mechanisms of market discipline in banking and certain forces, such 
as market participant confidence in bailouts, that undermine market discipline). 
231 Albert J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative 
Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431, 488 (1986) (observing that market discipline can be more 
efficient than top-down regulation). See also supra notes 81-86 (discussing direct and 
indirect costs of regulation). 
232 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and 
Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1228 n.73 (2002). 
233 Cf. Bernanke, supra note 7, at 6 (observing that, to the extent hedge funds are 
regulated solely through market discipline, government’s “primary task is to guard 
against a return of the weak market discipline that left major market participants overly 
vulnerable to market shocks”). A market discipline approach is sometimes used to help 
solve tragedies of the commons. See supra note 17. 
234  Cf. Bernanke, supra note 230 (observing that “[r]eceivership rules that make clear 
that investors will take losses when a bank becomes insolvent should increase the 
perceived risk of loss and thus also increase market discipline” and that, in “the United 
States, the banking authorities have ensured that, in virtually all cases, shareholders bear 
losses when a bank fails”). 
235 Bernanke, supra note 7; Ryan, supra note 7, at 2. 
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 Market discipline is, superficially, a low-cost prophylactic regulatory approach. 
For two reasons, however, a market-discipline approach only weakly facilitates the goal 
of stability. As discussed above, preventing systemic risk through market discipline is 
inherently suspect because no firm has sufficient incentive to limit its risk taking in order 
to reduce the danger of systemic contagion for other firms.
236 Perhaps this helps explain 
why, even though the banking and securities-brokerage industries have in large part been 
subject to a market-discipline regulatory approach,
237 significant potential for systemic 
risk from an LTCM default was attributed to the overly “generous terms from the banks 
and broker-dealers that provided credit [to LTCM] and served as counterparties.”
238  
 
Furthermore, even outside of the systemic-risk context, regulators have a mixed 
track record, absent prescriptive rules, of ensuring that participants exercise market 
discipline.
239 Until the recent subprime mortgage debacle, for example, competing banks 
were making more and more loans without financial covenants.
240 It is questionable, 
though, whether lending without financial covenants constitutes “safe and sound” 
banking practice.
241 The marked decline in the risk premium that has been charged by 
investors may well represent yet another example of weak market discipline.
242  
                                                 
236 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
237 See, e.g., Boro, supra note 231, at 471; Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: 
Relying on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 129–30, 129 n.1 
(1986). 
238 Bernanke, supra note 7, at 1. Professor Romano suggests that the breakdown of 
market discipline is due simply to human greed. Cf. Romano, supra note 148, at 79 
(discussing greed as a central factor that, in the hedge-fund context, transforms a 
successful hedging or moderately risky investment strategy into one of high-risk 
speculation). Bernanke suggests, however, a possible alternative psychological 
explanation: that “[i]nvestors, perhaps awed by the reputations of LTCM’s principals, did 
not ask sufficiently tough questions about the risks that were being taken to generate the 
high returns.” Bernanke, supra note 7, at 1. 
239 Partnoy, supra note 103, at 774. 
240 See supra note 45. 
241 Cf. supra note 45. Regulators are supposed to ensure that banks follow safe and sound 
banking practice. See 11 U.S.C. § 93(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2007) (fining banks for recklessly 
engaging in “unsafe” or “unsound” practices). 
242 See supra notes 132-139 and accompanying text. 
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This mixed track record is partly explained by behavioral psychology. Investors 
cannot accurately price risks that rarely occur and are unpredictable.
243 In the context of 
political risk, for example, investors “often alternate between assessments [of that risk] 
that, in hindsight, were either much too high or much too low,” creating a “pattern . . . of 
alternating optimism and skittishness.”
244 This pattern partly reflects “availability bias,” 
or the tendency of a recent crisis to be the most available concept in an investor’s 
mind.
245 In part, also, it reflects the documented human tendency to underestimate the 
likelihood of very rare but potentially devastating risks.
246 A similar alternating pattern 




Regulators’ occasional failures to maintain market discipline may also reflect the 
near-endemic shortage of funding for regulatory monitoring as well as a potential 
political bias against market interference.
248 According to the U.S. General Accounting 




                                                 
243  Claire A. Hill, How Investors React to Political Risk, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L 
283, 287-89 (1998). Scholars sometimes distinguish rare and unpredictable risks from 
other risks by calling the former “uncertainty.” Id. at 287 (citing Frank H. Knight, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1921)).  
244 Hill, supra note 243, at 286 (emphasis in original). 
245 Id. at 308. Cf. note 135, supra (discussing the availability heuristic).  
246 Hill, supra note 243, at 308. 
247 Cf. DAVIS, supra note 19, at 277 (arguing that this pattern may reflect “disaster 
myopia,” in which “memories of financial instability can rapidly fade, a process 
intensified by rapid turnover of staff and/or intense competition”). 
248 Greenspan, for example, had a serious bias against regulation and assumed market 
discipline was far better than it actually was. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 231.  
249 GAO Report GAO-02-302, SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates Challenges 
(March 5, 2002) (describing workload exceeding available workers since 1995 and also 
the SEC’s small salaries compared to other federal agencies which contributes to very 
high turnover), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02302.pdf. [But would that 
shortage be any less with express regulation? Perhaps, because there would be a clearer 
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Thus, although market discipline is attractive as a supplement to other regulatory 
approaches, there is some doubt whether it should serve as the exclusive, or even 
primary, regulatory mechanism.  
 
C. Assessing Regulatory Approaches 
 
The discussion above has identified several potential regulatory approaches. This 
article next assesses these approaches individually. First, it examines cost-benefit 
balancing as a means of assessment; second, it considers whether that balancing should 
be influenced by possible application of a precautionary principle; finally, it assigns 
possible values to that balancing.   
 
Cost-Benefit Balancing and the Precautionary Principle: 
Cost-benefit balancing, as has been discussed, is a means of measuring the 
efficiency of regulation.
250 It is also a well-recognized test for regulatory political 
viability. For example, before any major rule may take effect, U.S. regulatory agencies 
must submit a cost-benefit analysis to Congress.
251 To this end, regulatory agencies use a 
variety of methodologies to evaluate regulations,
252 including applying different values 
when monetizing the costs and benefits of regulations.
253 Regulatory evaluations also can 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulatory enforcement mandate to justify hiring, and most people comply with 
regulations anyway. cite] 
250 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.  
251 Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking Act, Chap 8, USCA && 801-08. 
“Major rules,” i.e., rules whose implementation entail substantial costs, cannot take effect 
during the sixty days afforded Congress to perform its review. See 5 U.S.C. § 801 (a)(3). 
Cf. EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 19 (arguing that a balance needs to be struck 
when examining the benefits and costs of regulation). 
252 Draft 2007 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation, 
Office of Management and Budget, at 8 (hereinafter, “OMB Report”). 
253 Id. The analysis regarding health and safety regulations is often context specific. 
Compare the EPA’s Clean Air Mercury Rule where the cost to a state of implementing 
the cap-and-trade system was compared to the ultimate health effects in humans of 
lowering the level of mercury that is consumed (i.e. morbidity, infant mortality and such 
welfare effects as visibility improvements) with DOL-OSHA’s Regulation on 
Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium (71 FR 10100) where the benefits of 
preventing 40-145 fatal and 5-20 non-fatal lung cancers per year were weighed against 
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take into account non-quantifiable benefits and costs that may have been key factors in an 
agency’s decision to promulgate a rule.
254  
 
To the extent regulation deals with health and safety issues (as could arise in the 
case of systemic risk
255), agencies go even further beyond strictly econometric cost-
benefit modeling. Perhaps the most relevant example for systemic risk is regulation 
designed to address the risk of catastrophic events or large, irreversible effects where the 
actual level of risk is indeterminate.
256 In these cases, regulators often apply a 
precautionary principle that presumes benefits will outweigh costs.
257 In the principle’s 
most utilized form, regulators may decide to regulate an activity notwithstanding lack of 
decisive evidence of the activity’s harm, such as controlling low-level exposure to 
carcinogens notwithstanding lack of proof of a causal connection between such exposure 
                                                                                                                                                 
OSHA’s estimated annual compliance costs of installing engineering controls and the 
purchase and use of supplemental respirators at the new Permissible Exposure Limit 
($36-896 million/yr versus $244-253 million/yr as monetized by the OMB). Regulatory 
Impact Analysis of the Clean Air Mercury Rule – Final Report at 1-1 and 12-1; and OMB 
Report, supra note 252, at 60.  
254 Id. at 8-9. In either event, in assessing costs and benefits, regulators often view an 
industry in isolation and ask what would have happened absent the regulation. Robert W. 
Hahn and John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 
YALE J. ON REG. 233, 239-40 (Winter 1991) (referring to this as the “partial equilibrium 
model”). To the extent regulation deals exclusively with economics, agencies will create 
econometric models based on the supply and demand characteristics of the industry 
before and after a regulatory change. Id. 
255 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
256 This type of regulation is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and 
Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848 (May 2006). A precautionary principle is 
most often used when assessing the impact of human actions on complex systems, such 
as the environment and human health, where the consequences of actions may be 
unpredictable. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 16 (2nd ed. 2007); Robert G. Chambers & Tigran A. Melkonyan, Pareto 
Optimal Trade in an Uncertain World: GMOs and the Precautionary Principle, 89 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 520, 528 (2007). 
257 Although this principle is often explicitly mentioned in international environmental 
regulations, it also is implicit in such domestic regulation as efforts to prevent terrorist 
attacks or regulation of the nuclear power industry, where high costs are justified even in 
the face of uncertain risk. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1005-07 (2003).  
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and adverse effects to human health.
258 Regulation should not be blindly precautionary
259 
but should be proportional to the chosen level of protection based upon an examination of 
potential benefits and costs, which include such non-economic considerations as public 
acceptability and the preeminence of health over economic considerations.
260  
 
Assigning Possible Values to the Cost-Benefit Balancing: 
This cost-benefit analysis applies to systemic risk as follows. The costs would be 
those of implementing the regulatory approach to reduce systemic risk, and the benefits 
would be measured by the costs saved by avoiding the risk. These saved costs would 
likely be high because they include not only direct economic costs but also indirect social 
costs.
261 Because the benefits (i.e., saved costs) would be realized only if systemic risk 
that otherwise would occur is avoided, they should be discounted by the less-than-100% 
probability that systemic risk will occur,
262 taking into account the also less-than-100% 
                                                 
258 Sunstein, supra note 257, at 1017-18. Governments have incorporated this principle 
into regulatory policies, and the European Commission has urged that the precautionary 
principle be considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk. Id.  
259 Under a stronger version of the precautionary principle, when an activity is shown to 
present a significant health or safety risk, regulatory decisions should be made so as to 
prevent the activity from being conducted notwithstanding scientific uncertainty as to the 
nature of the damage or the likelihood of its occurrence. Sunstein, supra note 256, at 849. 
This stronger version, however, offers little practical guidance to regulators. Sunstein 
supra note 257, at 1017-18. See also JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VS. 
RISK (1995) (demonstrating that interventions to reduce one risk may induce new 
countervailing risks); Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multi-Risk World, in HUMAN 
AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509 (Dennis D. 
Paustenbach ed., 2002) (arguing that although “precaution” can be a desirable strategy in 
some cases, strong versions of the precautionary principle can induce unintended 
countervailing risks, that the goal should be optimal rather than maximal precaution, and 
that actual regulation often moderates the degree of precaution in order to avoid these 
unintended risks). 
260 Sunstein supra note 257, at 1017-18. 
261 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing poverty, unemployment, and 
crime as potential social costs). 
262 Discounting the consequences of a risk by the probability of its occurring is 
sometimes referred to mathematically as R = p(X), where R = Risk, p = probability, and 
X = severity. 
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probability that regulation will avoid it. Regulation would be efficient whenever the 
expected value of those costs with regulation were less than that without regulation.
263
 
Formulaically, the expected value computations can be described as follows: 
 
Expected Value (without regulation) = [likelihood of systemic meltdown without 
regulation]% × $[cost of systemic meltdown] + [likelihood of avoiding systemic 
meltdown without regulation]% × $[cost of having avoided systemic meltdown]   
 
Expected Value (with regulation) = [likelihood of systemic meltdown with 
regulation]% × $[cost of systemic meltdown] + [likelihood of avoiding systemic 
meltdown with regulation]% × $[cost of having avoided systemic meltdown] + 
$[cost of regulation] 
 
To portray these equations more elegantly, let these amounts be represented by symbols, 
where 
 
EV1 is the Expected Value, without regulation 
EV2 is the Expected Value, with regulation 
γ is the likelihood of systemic meltdown without regulation, expressed as a 
percentage 
M is the cost of systemic meltdown, expressed in dollars 
A is the cost of having avoided systemic meltdown, expressed in dollars 
λ is the likelihood of systemic meltdown with regulation, expressed as a 
percentage 
R is the cost of regulation, expressed in dollars 
 
Using these symbols, 
 
                                                 
263 For examples of expected value analysis, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.1, at 445 & n.1 (6
th ed. 2003). 
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  EV1 = γ × M + (1- γ) × A 
 
  EV2 = λ × M + (1- λ) × A + R 
 
One can simplify these equations by recognizing that A, the cost (aside from the cost of 
regulation, R) of having avoided systemic meltdown, equals zero. Therefore,  
 
EV1 = γ × M 
 
  EV2 = λ × M + R 
 
Systemic risk thus should be regulated if EV2 is less than EV1 (that is, if λ × M + R is less 
than γ × M). 
 
The interesting question, therefore, is how to estimate the values to be used in 
these equations. Before examining what these values might be for the regulatory 
approaches identified, a generic balancing can provide a useful perspective. For this 
purpose, initially estimate γ, the likelihood of systemic meltdown without regulation, at 
the two-year “25% probability” prediction discussed at the Sixth Annual Conference of 
the International Insolvency Institute.
264 Even with regulation, there must be some chance 
of systemic risk occurring, so initially—without yet examining any particular regulatory 
approach—the article will estimate that risk, λ, at 10% in two years
265 on the theory that 
even the best regulatory approach cannot eliminate the chance of systemic risk. Although 
the cost of a systemic meltdown, M, is extremely difficult to pin down, analysts at J.P. 
                                                 
264 Memorandum from E. Bruce Leonard, President, International Insolvency Institute, to 
all Institute members 2 (June 16, 2006; on file with author) (discussing the prediction of a 
“25% probability within two years of a significant disruption in the international financial 
markets, probably attributable to the collapse or serious difficulties of a major hedge 
fund,” as one of the “highlights from the Conference”). 
265 Because the 25% probability of systemic risk absent regulation is a two-year estimate, 
the other values used in these equations will be based on two-year estimates. The 
applicable time period chosen is irrelevant so long as it is common for all values since 
these equations are being used solely for comparative purposes. 
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Morgan have estimated that LTCM’s failure would have cost its larger bank-creditors 
$500-700 million each, not to mention the costs to others.
266 The article therefore will 
initially assume that M is likely to be at least $1 billion, and perhaps far greater.
267 
Finally, although the cost of regulation, R, is dependent on the type of regulatory 
approach, initially assume it will not exceed $100 million biannually.
268
 
Applying these values, 10% × $1,000,000,000 + $100,000,000 = $200,000,000, 
which is less than 25% × $1,000,000,000 = $250,000,000. If these values are realistic, 
regulation appears to be justified. 
 
A quantitative analysis is no better than its assumptions, of course, and this 
article’s assumptions rely on no hard empirical data. Furthermore, a truly realistic 
balancing of costs and benefits could depend on the particular mechanisms by which 
systemic failures can arise.
269 The foregoing results should therefore be interpreted 
cautiously. All that can truly be said with confidence is that so long as M, the cost of a 
systemic meltdown, is much greater than R, the cost of regulation, then regulation should 
be justified.  
 
This provides, however, a useful way of thinking about the balancing, especially 
since M is likely to be much greater than R.
270 Moreover, because a systemic meltdown 
can be catastrophic though the actual level of risk is indeterminate,
271 a precautionary 
                                                 
266 LOWENSTEIN, supra note 37, at 190. 
267 Cf. David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, The Bear Flu: How It Spread, BUS. WK., Jan. 
7, 2008, at 30, 32 (suggesting that, globally, the “tab from the [subprime] mortgage mess 
could run up to $500 billion”); Tightening the Safety Belt, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2007 
(graph showing Goldman Sachs prediction of $148 billion of losses on subprime CDOs); 
Postcards from the Ledge, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2007 (estimating that, in the U.S., 
“[s]ubprime borrowers will probably default on $200 billion-300 billion of mortgages”).  
268 The term “biannually” being used here to mean every two years. See supra note 265. 
269 BOOKSTABER, supra note 69, at 257 (arguing that regulation will not help if there is a 
failure to understand the mechanisms by which crises develop). 
270 Indeed, R might even represent a profit, not a cost, if liquidity is provided to markets 
by purchasing securities at a deep discount. 
271 See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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principle might appropriately apply to the balancing, allowing regulation based on a 
presumption that benefits will outweigh costs. 
 
Critics of regulation, on the other hand, might argue that actual regulatory costs 
are likely to be much higher than $100 million biannually because any regulation would 
slow down economic growth, which itself would be a cost.
272 Because the equations 
above do not discount R, any such slowdown in economic growth would significantly 
increase EV2, making it less likely that regulation would be justified. Presumably, though, 
even if regulation could potentially slow down economic growth—and recall that any 
regulation should be crafted as not to have that effect
273—a slowdown would not be 
inevitable, so the cost of any slowdown should be discounted.  
 
Next consider how these equations might apply to the specific regulatory 
approaches previously identified.
274 Of these approaches, several do not seem worthy of 
further consideration. Regulation aimed at averting panics would likely fail to anticipate 
all the causes of these panics, would not necessarily deter even identified panics, and 
could impede market growth; mandating increased disclosure would do relatively little to 
deter systemic risk and may even be counterproductive; and placing limits on inter-
institution financial exposure or micromanaging institutions to diversify risk through 
hedging might retard investment, whereas institutions are market-driven anyway to 
diversify risk.
275 That leaves four potentially viable approaches: market discipline, ad hoc 
approaches, reducing leverage, and ensuring liquidity.   
 
Because market discipline has minimal regulatory costs, it is necessarily efficient 
under the equations.
276 It is nonetheless suspect as a regulatory approach for two reasons: 
                                                 
272 Cf. Bernanke, supra note 7 (observing that if hedge funds “were forced to reduce 
exposures in terms of liquidity risk, liquidity in a particular market segment could decline 
sharply and unexpectedly”). 
273 See supra note 80 and accompanying text and infra note 302 and accompanying text. 
274 See Part III.B. 
275 See supra Part III.B.  
276 This is because R, the cost of regulation, being one or more orders of magnitude less 
than M, the cost of a systemic meltdown, is vanishingly small in comparison and thus, for 
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firms lack sufficient incentive to limit risk taking in order to reduce the danger of 
systemic contagion for other firms, and regulators have a mixed track record of ensuring 
that participants exercise market discipline, absent prescriptive rules.
277 Market discipline 
therefore should be used as a supplement to other regulatory approaches. 
 
Ad hoc approaches do not quite fit, at least ex ante, into the equations because 
they are, by definition, crafted after a crisis occurs or is imminent. At that time, however, 
they are likely to be efficient in that it is then easier to measure and balance costs and 
benefits.
278 Ad hoc approaches also reduce the moral-hazard cost.
279 Nonetheless, these 
approaches are inherently second-best: after a crisis occurs or is imminent, there may 
well be insufficient time to implement optimal solutions, and the harm already may have 
been done or can no longer can be prevented.
280 Ad hoc approaches therefore should be 
considered to the extent a systemic meltdown threatens notwithstanding other 
protections.  
 
The remaining two regulatory approaches, reducing leverage and ensuring 
liquidity, are more appropriately suited for testing under the equations as potential 
solutions to the problem of systemic risk. Reducing leverage reduces the risk that a 
financial entity will fail in the first place, and also reduces the likelihood of a chain of 
institutional failures.
281 The trick, however, will be trying to find a simple way of 
determining the appropriate maximum amount of leverage for different types of 
companies—in each case a maximum that neither impairs the companies’ ability to 
operate efficiently nor impedes economic growth. To reduce monitoring and other 
regulatory costs, such a limitation on leverage might be imposed only on companies 
exceeding a certain size. Still, monitoring and enforcement could be at issue to the extent 
                                                                                                                                                 
equation purposes, can be effectively treated as zero. Hence EV2 is necessarily always 
less than EV1. 
277 See supra notes 235-249 and accompanying text. 
278 See supra notes 226-228 and accompanying text. 
279 See id. 
280 Id. 
281 See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text. 
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  Ensuring liquidity would help to prevent financial entities from defaulting, and 
also would help to prevent defaulting financial entities from failing. Liquidity 
additionally could be provided to capital markets as necessary to keep them functioning. 
Of the two suggested ways to ensure liquidity,
283 creating a liquidity provider of last 
resort appears to be simpler and easier to implement. Although establishing a liquidity 
provider of last resort could be expensive, especially to the extent it creates moral hazard, 
this expense could be controlled by following a policy of “constructive ambiguity” in 
deciding whether to lend
284 or, when providing liquidity to markets, by buying securities 
at a discount.
285 Other costs of a liquidity provider of last resort would appear to be 
modest.
286    
 
  Subject to the caveats noted,
287 how might these two approaches fare under a cost-
benefit analysis? Although the expected value without regulation, EV1, would not change, 
the expected value with regulation, EV2, would change because both λ, the likelihood of 
systemic meltdown with regulation, and R, the cost of regulation, are functions of the 
particular regulatory approach. Consider first the reducing-leverage approach. This 
                                                 
282 See Report and Recommendations Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 On Arrangements with Off-Balance Sheet Implications, Special Purpose 
Entities, and Transparency of Filings by Issuers (June 15, 2005), in which the SEC staff 
recommended, id. at 3, that “transactions and transaction structures primarily motivated 
by accounting and reporting concerns, rather than economics” be discouraged in the 
future through a combination of changes to accounting standards by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and greater awareness by participants in the 
financial reporting process. 
283 The other way is to impose entity-level liquidity requirements. See supra note 225 and 
accompanying text. 
284 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
285 See supra notes 218-219 and accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
287  See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text (cautioning that a quantitative 
analysis is no better than its assumptions, and this article’s assumptions rely on no hard 
empirical data; and that a truly realistic balancing of costs and benefits could depend on 
the particular mechanisms by which systemic failures can arise). 
SystemicRisk_repost2-08.doc   65
approach would probably strongly reduce the risk of a systemic meltdown. Therefore 
assume that λ = 5% for this approach. But because the approach would be very 
expensive, assume, for illustrative purposes, that R = $1 billion. Inserting these values 
into the equations,  
 
EV1 = γ x M  
       = $250,000,000 
 
EV2 = λ x M + R 
       = 5% x $1,000,000,000 + $1,000,000,000 
       = $1,050,000,000 
 
Therefore, under these values, this regulatory approach, reducing leverage, would not 
appear to be justified.  
 
  As mentioned, however, the cost of a systemic meltdown, M, is likely to be far in 
excess of $1 billion.
288 Consider how the answer might change if M were varied. Assume, 
for example, first that M = $2 billion and then that M = $5 billion. If M = $2 billion, EV2 
still would remain greater than EV1,
289 so reducing leverage again would not be justified 
as a regulatory approach. And, even if M = $5 billion, the equations would only reach a 
parity.
290 Reducing leverage therefore might not be justified as a regulatory approach 
unless ways can be found to significantly reduce its costs.
291   
                                                 
288 See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
289 EV1 = γ × M = 25% × $2,000,000,000 = $500,000,000. EV2 = λ × M + R = 5% × 
$2,000,000,000 + $1,000,000,000 = $1,100,000,000. Therefore EV2 is greater than EV1. 
290 EV1 = γ × M = 25% × $5,000,000,000 = $1,250,000,000. EV2 = λ × M + R = 5% × 
$5,000,000,000 + $1,000,000,000 = $1,250,000,000. 
291 Some estimates of M could nonetheless reach sufficiently high levels to justify 
regulatory approaches such as reducing leverage. Consider, for example, a systemic-risk 
doomsday scenario along the lines of the Great Depression. From its peak in 1929, to its 
cyclical nadir in 1933, the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) shrank 45.6% as a result of 
that Depression. GDP and Other Major NIPA Series, 1929-2006: II, SURV. CURRENT 
BUS., Aug. 2006, at 169, available at 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2006/08August/0806_GDP_NIPAs.pdf. If a systemic 
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  Next consider the approach of ensuring liquidity. This approach would probably 
moderately reduce the risk of a systemic meltdown. Therefore assume that λ = 10% for 
this approach. Although this approach could be very expensive insofar as it fosters moral 
hazard, the article will assume that moral hazard is controlled through a policy of 
constructive ambiguity.
292 Therefore assume, for illustrative purposes, that R = $100 
million.
293 Inserting these values into the equations,   
 
EV1 = γ x M  
       = $250,000,000 
 
EV2 = λ x M + R 
       = 0.10 x $1,000,000,000 + $100,000,000 
       = $200,000,000 
 
It therefore appears that ensuring liquidity may well be a viable regulatory approach since 
EV2 is $50,000,000 less than EV1. And the attractiveness of this regulatory approach 
would be dramatically enhanced if the variations of M discussed above were applicable. 
For example, if M = $2 billion, EV2 would be $200,000,000 less than EV1 .
294 And, if M = 
$5 billion, EV2 would be $650,000,000 less than EV1 .
295 This result, that EV2  is less than 
                                                                                                                                                 
meltdown of equal consequence hit the United States today, the GDP would shrink (using 
a GDP of $13.29 trillion, the most recent figure available) by—and thus M would 
equal—$6.06 trillion. See id. at 173. This article does not suggest that M is likely to be 
anywhere near that order of magnitude. 
292 See supra notes 198 & 284 and accompanying text. 
293 This biannual value for R appears reasonable given that the much more complex effort 
of implementing the Basel II regulatory measures is estimated by the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget to cost, in total over four years, only $545.9 million (present 
value). OMB Report, supra note 252, at 56. 
294 EV1 = $500,000,000. EV2 = 0.10 × $2,000,000,000 + $100,000,000 = $300,000,000. 
295 EV1 = $1,250,000,000. EV2 = 0.10 × $5,000,000,000 + $100,000,000 = $600,000,000. 
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EV1, is largely supported even if γ, the likelihood of systemic meltdown without 
regulation, is stressed downward.
296
 
Therefore, even without the support provided by the precautionary principle, it 
appears that ensuring liquidity should be justified as a regulatory approach to the 
extent—as this article argues should be possible




A regulation establishing a liquidity provider of last resort, then, is the approach 
to minimizing systemic risk that would have the best chance of success under any number 
of circumstances. The liquidity provider of last resort would provide liquidity to help 
prevent critical financial intermediaries from defaulting and to help prevent defaulting 
critical financial intermediaries from failing. It also would provide liquidity to capital 
markets as necessary to keep them functioning.
298 In the former case, the liquidity 
provider of last resort could minimize moral hazard by adopting a policy of constructive 
ambiguity, refusing to commit itself unequivocally to bailing out defaulting 
intermediaries.
299 In the latter case, the liquidity provider of last resort could minimize 
                                                 
296 Consider, for example, stressing γ, the likelihood of systemic meltdown without 
regulation, downward from 25% to as low as 10%. Then λ, the likelihood of systemic 
meltdown with regulation, necessarily would reduce, say from 10% to 3%. Applying the 
$1 billion, $2 billion, and $5 billion variations of M yields the following results. If M = 
$1 billion, then EV1 = $100,000,000 and EV2 = $130,000,000, making regulation slightly 
inefficient. But if M = $2 billion, then EV1 = $200,000,000 and EV2 = $160,000,000, 
making regulation efficient; and if M = $5 billion, then EV1 = $500,000,000 and EV2 = 
$250,000,000, making regulation highly efficient.  
297 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.  
298 See supra notes 216-224 and accompanying text. 
299 See Frederic S. Mishkin, Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities, 23 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 675, 683 (1999). For this policy to be credible, however, the liquidity 
provider of last resort might sometimes have to let a critical financial intermediary fail. 
Marvin Goodfriend & Jeffrey M. Lacker, Limited Commitment and Central Bank 
Lending 19 (Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 99-2, 1999). 
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moral hazard simply by buying securities at a discount so that market prices stabilize at a 
level well below the levels paid by speculating investors.
300
 
It is important that the liquidity provider of last resort  be “in place” because 
market collapses can occur rapidly and without warning.
301
 
The liquidity provider of last resort should not, or should only minimally, shift 
costs to taxpayers. This can be accomplished, for example, by charging premiums to 
market participants or by privatizing the liquidity-provider-of-last-resort function or, 
where that function is taxpayer-financed, by investing any pre-funded money to maintain 
its value until used.
302 Loans should be advanced at market interest rates, and securities 
should be purchased at discounts. In either case, the liquidity provider is more likely to 
recover its investment if it receives priority of repayment on such loan advances and 
purchased securities.  
 
The foregoing should be supplemented by a market-discipline approach, under 
which regulators would attempt to ensure that market participants exercise the type of 
diligence that enables the market to work efficiently.
303  
 
To the extent these approaches fail to deter a systemic meltdown, government 
should seek to prevent the meltdown or mitigate its impact by implementing whatever ad 
hoc approaches appear, at the time, to be appropriate. 
 
                                                 
300 See supra notes 218-219 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 200-204 & 216-218 and accompanying text. [Consider also imposing 
restrictions on loans to minimize adverse selection, to avoid deterring systematic risk, and 
to avoid impairing financial innovation. Cf. supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text 
(discussing that systematic risk is economically healthy); Bernanke, supra note 7, at 6 
(observing that trying to “entirely eliminate systemic risk . . . would likely stifle 
innovation without achieving the intended goal”). cite] 
303 See supra notes 233-235 and accompanying text. [Expand textual discussion. cite] 
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Although some of these recommended approaches are prophylactic, aimed at 
anticipating and preventing systemic collapses, and some are reactive, focused on 
mitigating the spread and consequences of such collapses, the reactive elements 
dominate.
304 In part this reflects the aforesaid tragedy of the commons, making traditional 
prophylactic protections, including disclosure and other market-discipline measures, 
insufficient to internalize costs. In part, also, it may reflect that cost-effective 
prophylactic measures are simply difficult to craft. There are many ways that systemic 
crises can occur, and trying to regulate all would dampen the economy. For example, one 
could deter another subprime mortgage crisis by regulating a collateral-value restriction 
on mortgage loans, but that would impede home ownership and impose other costs.
305 
Even without regulation, however, such a crisis might not be repeated, whereas other, 
unforeseen crises may arise. 
 
The foregoing analysis has examined systemic risk without necessarily 
identifying or distinguishing the country or countries in which such risk arises. Because 
financial markets and institutions increasingly cross sovereign borders, a systemic 
collapse in one country inevitably will affect markets and institutions in other 
countries.




IV. REGULATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
                                                 
304 Market discipline is a prophylactic regulatory approach and a liquidity provider of last 
resort acts prophylactically to prevent a collapse; but the primary function of a liquidity 
provider of last resort is reactive—to mitigate the spread and consequences of systemic 
collapse—and ad hoc approaches are, by definition, purely reactive. 
305 See supra notes 140-142 and accompanying text. 
306 See, e.g., Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, Global Financial Transmission of 
Monetary Policy Shocks 26–27 (Eur. Cen. Bank, Working Paper No. 616, 2006) 
(showing that U.S. monetary shocks have a significant effect on foreign stock markets, 
and that the more financially integrated countries are, the greater the effect of a monetary 
shock in one country on such other countries); Michele Fratianni & John Pattison, 
International Financial Architecture and International Financial Standards, 579 ANNALS 
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International regulation of financial systems has been subject to a roller coaster of 
a ride. In the latter years of World War II, the Bretton Woods system was established to 
rebuild the international financial framework and set transnational rules for monetary 
policy.
307 Central to this system was the fixing of exchange rates of all major currencies 
to the U.S. dollar, with the value of the dollar linked to gold at a guaranteed price of 
thirty-five dollars per ounce.
308 As a result, exchange rates were remarkably stable for the 
next twenty-five years.
309 By the 1960s, however, in the face of rapidly expanding world 
trade, it became increasingly clear that the gold supply was incapable of supporting the 
strong demand for global liquidity.
310 Faced with persistent payment deficits, the U.S. 
turned in part to its gold reserves and even more substantially to U.S. dollars to finance 
its debts, making the volume of dollars held by foreigners soar and the U.S. gold reserves 
dwindle.
311 In 1971, President Richard Nixon instructed the U.S. Treasury Secretary to 
                                                                                                                                                 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 183, 184 (2002) (observing increasing concern over 
transmission internationally of local financial failures). 
307 RAHUL DHUMALE, JOHN EATWELL, & KERN ALEXANDER, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 20, 82 (2006) 
(noting that the Bretton Woods system received its name from its founding conference in 
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 and comprised several agreements among 
economic planners to rebuild the global economic order). These agreements also 
established the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“World Bank”). Id. 
308 EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 1. Nations entrusted gold as an international 
medium of exchange because of its earlier use under the gold standard, and they accepted 
the dollar as an international currency because the U.S. had accumulated significant 
quantities of gold. CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, ECONOMICS: 
PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 724 (2004). They therefore came to accept gold 
and the dollar as international reserves, with the dollar convertible into gold on demand. 
Id. 
309 EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 1. 
310 ROBERT GUTTMAN, MONEY AND FINANCE: TOWARD A NEW MONETARY REGIME 15 
(1997). 
311 MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 308, at 724. This in turn made it increasingly 
doubtful that the U.S. would be able to continue to convert dollars into gold at $35 dollars 
per ounce, or that dollars would continue to function as instruments of international 
monetary reserves. Id. 
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suspend all sales and purchases of gold, marking the beginning of the end of the Bretton 
Woods system and of fixed exchange rates.
312  
 
The resulting deregulation and liberalization of financial markets brought a 
substantial increase in cross-border capital flows and trade in financial services.
313 
Initially acclaimed,
314 deregulation is now seen as a double-edged sword because 
unregulated financial institutions and markets have become increasingly 
interdependent.
315 That, in turn, has increased the global market’s exposure to systemic 
risk.
316 Can international regulation mitigate this risk?  
 
                                                 
312 EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 1. 
313 EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at 1–3. DHUMALE, EATWELL, & ALEXANDER, 
supra note 307, at 14. 
314 See, e.g., Alan Friedman, But Nations Appear Reluctant: IMF Pushing to Open East 
Asian Markets, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept.  20, 1997 (quoting a top IMF official as 
claiming “the benefits of liberalizing . . . outweigh the potential costs” and a former WTO 
chief as asserting that financial-services liberalization was “the cure, not the cause” of 
East Asian economic crisis of 1997); Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. 
Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 
BROOK. L. REV. 1295, 1354 n.76 (noting that in the early 1990’s, the U.S. Treasury 
Department unequivocally endorsed financial liberalization by “regularly pressuring 
other nations to free their domestic interest rates and divorce central bank policy from 
democratic and parliamentary control”). 
315 Jayati Ghosh, The Economic and Social Effects of Financial Liberalization: A Primer 
for Developing countries 9 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Working Paper No. 4, 2005) available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2005/wp4_2005.pdf (“[F]inancial liberalization 
creates exposure to the following kinds of risk: a propensity to financial crises, both 
external and internal; a deflationary impact on real economic activity and reduced access 
to funds for small-scale producers, both urban and rural. This in turn has major social 
effects in terms of loss of employment and more volatile material conditions for most 
citizens.”); GERARD CAPRIO, PATRICK HONOHAN, & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FINANCIAL 
LIBERALIZATION: HOW FAR, HOW FAST? 15–17 (2001) (observing that the liberalized 
financial markets “laid bare the previous inefficiencies and failures in credit allocation” 
and undermined efforts to valuate the true value of bank capital and the true risk of bank 
portfolios). See also EATWELL & TAYLOR, supra note 80, at ix (“The presumption, widely 
held before 1997, that financial liberalization is invariably beneficial has now been 
abandoned by almost all serious commentators.”). 
316 DHUMALE, EATWELL, & ALEXANDER, supra note 307, at 14.  
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Because this article’s analysis of limiting systemic risk is not necessarily tied to 
the United States or to a domestic financial system, the article’s recommendations—to 
establish a liquidity provider of last resort, supplemented by a market-discipline approach 
and, as needed, by ad hoc remedies—should theoretically have equal application to 
limiting cross-border systemic risk. In an international context, however, two issues 
emerge: is a single regulatory approach feasible, and, if it is, who should act as the 
international liquidity-provider of last resort (ILOLR)?     
 
Whether or not feasible, a single regulatory approach certainly appears desirable, 
being easier to adopt and administer in a global economy than country-specific regulation 
and also lessening the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom.
317 Nonetheless, given 
the diversity of approaches to financial regulation and supervision among various nations 
of the world, some commentators believe that any single regulatory model would be 
impractical.
318 The optimal regulatory model, they argue, must be customized for each 
country in accord with the structure and size of the country’s financial system, its specific 
regulatory and supervisory objectives, and its unique historical evolution and political 
traditions.
319 At the very least, some of these observers contend, the Anglo-American 
concept of fiduciary duty, which supports a broad range of institutions and regulatory 
structures, is impossible to replicate in the traditionally less stringently regulated Roman 
law systems throughout Europe, Africa, Latin America, and many parts of Asia.
320   
                                                 
317 Cf. Elene Spanakos, Note: Harmonization of International Adequacy Rules for 
Securities Firms: An Argument to Implement the Value At Risk Approach by Adopting 
Basle’s Internal Model Methodology, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 221, 241–42, 244 (2000) 
(arguing that without international standards there will be a “race to the bottom” in 
regulatory schemes). 
318 See, e.g., David T. Llewellyn, Institutional Structure of Financial Regulation and 
Supervision: The Basic Rules, p. 7, Paper presented at a World Bank Seminar June 6th 
and 7th, 2006 available at: info.worldbank.org/etools/library/latestversion.asp?232743 
(arguing that “[i]t is an illusion to believe there is a single, superior model of institutional 
structure that is applicable to all countries”); JAMES A. HANSON, PATRICK HONOHAN, & 
GIOVANNI MAJNONI, GLOBALIZATION AND NATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 273-74 
(2003). 
319 Llewewllyn, supra note 318. 
320 HANSON, HONOHAN & MAJNONI, supra note 318 (arguing that the pervasive looting of 
newly privatized entities in Central and Eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of 
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These differences do not, however, appear to undermine the concept of a single 
regulatory approach to systemic risk. Political scientists and economists have observed 
that international cooperation is the natural and most effective response of states that 
share an interest in averting a common crisis that affects them individually—despite the 
many historical, cultural, and legal differences that distinguish nations.
321 An otherwise 
effective regulatory approach to systemic risk therefore ought to have the potential for 
international applicability.
322 Basel II effectively illustrates that a single regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                 
small country capital markets in places like Slovakia evidence the challenges inherent in 
broad and sudden changes to a financial system’s regulatory structure). Accord, DAVID F. 
GOOD, ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN EAST AND CENTRAL EUROPE: LEGACIES FROM 
THE PAST AND POLITICS FOR THE FUTURE 3-4 (1994). 
321 See, e.g., James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 
52 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, Spring 1998, at 271 (“Whether the goal is to control 
arms racing, reduce the risk of preemptive war, limit global environmental damage, 
stabilize exchange rates, or reduce protectionism in trade, state leaders . . . coordinate 
state policies and the actions of the relevant state bureaucracies . . . to gain various 
benefits of cooperating.”); RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 120–123 (1994) (suggesting systemic risk is 
analogous to epidemiological risk, in that both can be effectively resolved by 
international collaboration when “countries agree[] on how to act . . . [and their] 
cooperation advance[s] to the point of establishing an international agency and jointly 
financing international action to control and attempt to eradicate” the contagion); Edward 
J. Kane, Government Officials as a Source of Systemic Risk in International Financial 
Markets, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND POLICIES 
257–58 (Franklin R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1992) (analogizing the global 
financial system to the interconnected subsystems of the human body and implying that 
just as the central immune system is the most efficient way to regulate the health of the 
body’s many subsystems, so is a universal regulatory approach the most efficient means 
of regulating systemic financial risk). 
322 See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 269 (arguing against possible “excessive readiness to 
assume that the current domestic situation is unique”); Benn Steil, “Regulatory 
Foundations for Global Capital Markets,” in FINANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY, (RICHARD O’BRIEN, ed.) 66 (1992): “Since any systemic effects of inadequate 
or misguided regulation in one jurisdiction cannot be contained within that single 
jurisdiction, the imposition of universal standards or modes or operation is likely to be 
the only effective response.” DHUMALE, EATWELL, & ALEXANDER, supra note 307, at 270 
(proposing the establishment of a Global Financial Governance Council to coordinate 
“effective international financial regulation . . . [using] a multilateral treaty regime that 
combines legally binding principles of efficient regulation (i.e., capital adequacy and 
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scheme for financial risk can be applied, at least in the banking context, across diverse 
national financial systems.
323 Approximately 100 countries have signaled they will 
implement Basel II by 2010.
324   
 
A single regulatory approach thus appears feasible for mitigating systemic risk. 
Who should act, however, as the ILOLR?
325 There are at least two obvious choices. One 
is the IMF, which sometimes already takes on this role, albeit with controversy, in 
extending liquidity to troubled sovereign states.
326 Another choice would be one or more 
national central banks, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank or the European Central 
Bank.  
 
Compare, for example, how the IMF and the Federal Reserve might function in an 
ILOLR capacity. At least one commentator argues that the Federal Reserve would be a 
better ILOLR than the IMF.
327 An ILOLR should ideally be able to advance funds in a 
widely-used international currency, and the Federal Reserve is a source of U.S. dollars.
328 
                                                                                                                                                 
consolidated supervision) and a mechanism for developing nonbinding soft law codes 
(capital adequacy formulas and coordination of enforcement)” 
323 See Bank for International Settlements, Basel II and Financial Institution Resiliency, 
June 27, 2007, available at: http://www.bis.org/press/p070627.htm%5D.; IOANNIS S. 
AKKIZIDIS & VIVIANNE BOUCHEREAU, GUIDE TO OPTIMAL OPERATIONAL RISK AND 
BASEL II, 99–105 (2006). 
324 [cite] The chairman of Basel II concedes, however, that implementing the accord will 
be extremely difficult. Peter Norman, Basel II Chairman Says Rules Will Be Hard to 
Implement, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 11, 2005. Some also argue that Basel II may 
actually prove counterproductive. See, e.g., DHUMALE, EATWELL, & ALEXANDER, supra 
note 307, at 263 (arguing that because the majority of developed nations will adopt some 
variation of Basel II, the G10 countries are likely to exert at least moderate pressure on 
developing nations to permit foreign banks to operate in their markets under Basel II, 
which in turn could have a disproportionate impact on the composition of credit risk in 
those jurisdictions and place foreign banks at a distinct advantage over local banks). 
325 See supra note 223 and accompanying text (calling for creation of an ILOLR). 
326 See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. 
327 Although the European Central Bank was not in contention when the above 
comparison was made, the European Central Bank is closely analogous to the Federal 
Reserve for purposes of such comparison. 
328 ROBERT KELEHER, JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, AN INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF 
LAST RESORT, THE IMF, AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 178 (Comm. Print 1999) (arguing 
that the Federal Reserve Bank “has international reserve or money-creating powers and, 
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The IMF, in contrast, has no power to create currency. The Federal Reserve also may 
have an advantage in that it is, arguably, less bureaucratic than the IMF and thus capable 
of making quicker decisions.
329 Thus, the Federal Reserve (and, by analogy, the European 
Central Bank) appears to have a better institutional capacity than the IMF to act as an 
ILOLR.  
 
On the other hand, any national central bank (including the Federal Reserve or 
European Central Bank) acting as an ILOLR would face possible conflicts of interest 
between its national and international responsibilities. The IMF, in contrast, is a truly 
international organization. Furthermore, through its access to member-state capital, the 
IMF can theoretically spread the burden of responding to international systemic risk.
330 
The IMF cannot, however, create currency. It would not need that power if it has access 
to a potentially unlimited amounts of currency,
331 but such access would require reform 
of the IMF’s relationship with its member-states.
332  
 
There therefore is no clear choice who should act, as among existing institutions, 





                                                                                                                                                 
accordingly, can act to satisfy increased demands for liquidity [and also] can act to create 
liquidity quickly via open market operations rather than through the slower, more 
cumbersome discount window mechanism,” though tying this argument in part to the 
U.S. dollar being the dominant reserve currency). 
329 Id at 7 (the IMF “cannot create reserves or international money, cannot act quickly 
enough to serve as an international LOLR, and does not operate in a transparent manner. 
Further, IMF lending currently (indirectly) serves to bail out insolvent institutions, 
something wholly inappropriate for an international LOLR.”). 
330 Knedlik, supra note 199, at 26 (describing the IMF’s substantial access to capital from 
more than 20 member states). 
331 Id. at 8 (“In the case of a global crisis . . . almost unlimited reserves would be 
necessary”).  
332 Id. at 26 (discussing how the IMF could obtain “quantitatively unlimited” access to 
member-state funds). 
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  This article, which is the first major work of legal scholarship on systemic risk, 
has examined what systemic risk really means, cutting through the confusion and 
ambiguity to establish basic parameters. Economists and other scholars historically have 
tended to think of systemic risk in terms of financial institutions such as banks, and only 
infrequently in terms of financial markets. However with the growth of disintermediation, 
in which companies can access capital market funding without going through banks or 
other intermediary-institutions, greater focus should be devoted to financial markets and 
the relationship between markets and institutions.  
 
  This same focus reveals that the monetary-policy actions taken by the Federal 
Reserve in the recent subprime mortgage crisis, although helpful, would have been 
insufficient to stop a full-fledged systemic collapse. This is because monetary-policy 
primarily impacts banks, not financial markets, and it is markets, not banks, that are 
increasingly at risk. This is not to say that monetary policy should be discarded, merely 
that it must be augmented by measures that more directly address systemic risk in 
markets. 
 
This article attempts to identify and assess these measures. A threshold question is 
whether regulatory measures are appropriate. The article argues they are because, like a 
tragedy of the commons, market participants have insufficient incentives, absent 
regulation, to limit risk taking in order to reduce the systemic danger to others.  
 
The article demonstrates the optimality of a multi-tiered regulatory approach. A 
liquidity provider of last resort should be created to provide liquidity, as appropriate to 
prevent systemic collapse, to failing financial institutions and markets. Liquidity ensures 
maximum flexibility because “[i]t could solve any problem, irrespective of its cause. 
Trying to address . . . the cause [] is almost like fighting the last war because the next 
problem will be different.”
333   
 
                                                 
333 Systemic Risk Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of the author [at p. 68 of the Hearing’s 
transcript-cite]). 
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To minimize moral hazard, the liquidity provider of last resort could lend under a 
policy of constructive ambiguity and invest in market securities at a deep discount. If the 
liquidity provider is governmental, it could minimize taxpayer costs by either charging 
premiums to market participants or investing funds to maintain their value until used and 
then charging market-rate interest on loans (or taking market discounts on purchases). 
The liquidity-provider-of-last-resort function also could be privatized. In either case, the 
liquidity provider is more likely to recover full value if it receives a repayment priority on 
its loans and investments. 
 
The liquidity-provider-of-last-resort function should be supplemented by market 
discipline, in which regulators attempt to ensure that market participants exercise the type 
of diligence that enables the market to work efficiently. To the extent these approaches 
fail to deter a systemic meltdown, government should seek to prevent the meltdown or 
mitigate its impact by implementing whatever ad hoc approaches appear, at the time, to 
be appropriate. 
 
Finance and markets being globally interconnected, systemic collapse in one 
country inevitably will affect markets and institutions in other countries. The article 
therefore also examines the feasibility of internationally regulating systemic risk, the 
extent to which regulatory solutions are universal or should be different for different 
countries, and the potential for a regulatory race to the bottom if regulation is done only 
on a national level. 
 
  Whether regulation is national or international, the choice of specific regulatory 
approaches, including a realistic assessment of their costs and benefits, ultimately may 
depend on the particular mechanisms by which systemic failures can arise.
334 To that 
extent, regulation is a moving target since new financial instruments and markets 
                                                 
334 See supra note 269 and accompanying text. For an interesting attempt to categorize 
mechanisms by which non-systemic market failures can arise, see Partnoy, supra note 
103. But compare supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of 
categorizing such mechanisms).  
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continue to be developed.
335 For this reason, the article is necessarily only a first step in 
conceptualizing potential solutions—intended to start, but not end, the legal debate over 
systemic risk. 
 
                                                 
335 See, e.g., BOOKSTABER, supra note 69, at 255. See also Yamaguchi, supra note 8, at 3 
(observing that even the best preventative measures may not succeed in removing the 
sources of systemic risk in an environment where financial intermediation evolves at a 
speed faster than one can anticipate). 
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